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Media Ownership Regulation, 
the First Amendment, 
and Democracy's Future 
Adam Candeub' 
Unprecedented consolidation has swept the media industries. At the 
same time, court rulings have savaged the Federal Communication 
Commission's (FCC) limits on corporate control of radio, television, and 
newspapers, leading to stacks of proceedings languishing at the FCC. 
These rulings have fomented a vocal political struggle between consumer 
groups advocating ownership restrictions and the media industry 
pressuring for deregulation. 
This Article argues that the FCC's regulations have failed because they 
have misconstrued their goal, viewing media ownership as a sort of 
antitrust law for the "marketplace of ideas. "The FCC attempts to find the 
"optimal number" of independently owned media outlets, which it assumes 
will create a sufficient diversity of voices and viewpoints. As this Article 
shows, using this antitrust metaphor to gUide policy confuses social and 
economic goals, creating an incoherent regulatory standard ripe for 
judicial reversal. 
Rather than attempting to identify the optimal number of media outlets, 
the FCC should strengthen the vital function the media plays in a 
democratic society: decreasing citizens' costs in monitoring government. 
By reading the newspaper or watching the news, citizens can learn about 
available government benefits and detect elected officials' inappropriate 
• Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Thanks to the 
participants of the Wharton Colloquium on Media and Communications Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania for their commentary on an earlier draft of this paper, in 
particular Ellen Goodman, Gerry Faulhaber, Monroe Price, Christian Sandvig, Kevin 
Werbach, and Christopher Yoo. Thanks also to Steve Wildman, Peter Alexander, 
Barbara Bean, and Keith Brown. Thanks to H.W. Candeub and Lara Leaf for their 
editing, and to the tremendous library research staff at MSU College of Law. In the 
interest of disclosure, I worked on several of the media ownership proceedings 
discussed in this Article while an attorney at the Federal Communications 
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behavior without incessantly watching C-SPAN or making endless FOIA 
requests. The FCC's regulations, therefore, should maximize the output of 
news about politics, rendering .the agency relationship between citizens 
and politicians more effective. 
Rather than use direct subsidies, a policy response many have urged but 
which presents Significant problems, the FCC should alter the quantity 
and nature of news production through its regulation of media industry's 
ownership and geographic structures. New economic and social science 
research has shown that these structural features stronglyinjluence news 
output and content. For instance, the greater degree of overlap between 
media markets and political jurisdictions increases the amount of political 
news coverage. Media ownership regulation must utilize these insights to 
maximize output of political news. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, unprecedented consolidation has swept the media 
industries. The number of independent television station owners has 
dropped 40% since 1995. 1 The number of commercial radio station 
owners has declined by 34% since 1996, and a nationally dominant 
radio station group, Clear Channel Communications, has emerged. 2 
These consolidations have led to a handful of media conglomerates 
determining what programming Americans watch and hear. Tom 
Wolzien of Bernstein Research, a noted media industry analyst, 
1 S. REp. No. 108-141, at 2-3 (2003), as reprinted in 2003 U.s.C.C.A.N. 145, 155-59. 
2 Id. 
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observes that five media conglomerates control "about a 75% share of 
prime-time viewing," and if current trends continue, will control "the 
same percentage of TV households in prime time as the three 
net[workls did 40 years ago."3 This dramatic change has generated 
tremendous public interest, with many in what can be dubbed the 
"anti-big media" political movement calling upon the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") to maintain 
or expand ownership restrictions. 4 
At the same time, recent judicial decisions have savaged the FCC's 
media regulations, which since the New Deal have controlled media 
consolidation by limiting the size and extent of corporate ownership 
of radio, television, and newspapers.s These rulings have led to a 
quagmire of unresolved media ownership proceedings that currently 
languish before the FCC. In addition, the Supreme Court's fractured 
pluralities in Turner Broadcasting System., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1) and 
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner II) have placed many 
of the FCC's media ownership regulations under stricter First 
Amendment scrutiny.6 
Media ownership limits have failed because the FCC has 
insufficiently analyzed their underlying purpose. Uncritically 
adopting the "marketplace of ideas" as a guiding metaphor for the 
First Amendment, the FCC treats media ownership regulation as an 
antitrust regime governing this marketplace. The FCC aims to ensure 
enough independent voices and viewpoints so as to "achiev[el 'the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources."'7 The FCC therefore pursues an inherently 
3 Tom Wolzien & Mark MacKenzie, Returning Oligopoly of Media Content 
Threatens Cable's Power, BERNSTEIN RESEARCH, (Sanford c. Bernstein & Co., N.Y., 
N.Y.), Feb. 7, 2003, at 3, available at http://www.creativevoices.uslcgi-uploadl 
newslnews_articlelBernsteinstudy. pdf. 
+ For an excellent analysis of the current struggle, see ERIC KUNENBERG, FIGHTING 
FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA'S MEDIA 17-36, 294 (2007). For an even 
more recent report of the current state of affairs, see Amy Schatz, Nonprofit Takes on 
Big Media, WALLST.j., Mar. 7,2007, atA2. 
, See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting most of 2003 Biennial Media Ownership Order); Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. 
v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding FCC's local broadcast ownership 
rules); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(remanding FCC's national broadcast ownership limits); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. 
FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding FCC's national cable limits). 
6 520 U.s. 180 (1997) (Turner II); 512 U.S. 622,669 (1994) (Turner I). In both 
Turner I and Turner II, no one opinion garnered five votes. Rather, in both decisions, 
a concurring justice decided the case. 
7 Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
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vague, even meaningless, regulatory inquiry into how many "voices" 
exist in a given media market. Courts, in rejecting virtually every FCC 
media ownership regulation in recent years, have recoiled at the FCC's 
inconsistent, unprincipled answers.8 
Rather than protect the number of "media voices," the FCC should 
protect the essential function the media serves in a democracy - to 
minimize the difficulties citizens face in monitoring government. By 
reading the newspaper or watching the news, citizens can learn about 
available public benefits and detect inappropriate behavior of public 
officials without having to read the Federal Register, make Freedom of 
Information Act ("FOIA") requests, or watch C-SPAN incessantly. 
Media regulation should create ownership structures that maximize 
the amount of political news, making it easier for citizens to monitor 
government. 9 
The FCC can do this because it regulates the ownership and 
geographic structure of the media industry, both of which affect news 
content and quantity. Economic structure determines and constructs, 
to a real and quantifiable degree, political and social media coverage. 
Recent scholarship shows (1) increased exposure to news media will 
increase voter turnout and the ability of those voters exposed to news-
rich media to obtain government benefits, (2) the high fixed-costilow 
marginal-cost structure of media production leads to political news 
(quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944)). The FCC has 
explicitly based its media ownership regulation on this judicial understanding. See, 
e.g., In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Comm'n's Broad. 
Ownership Rules &: Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. 
Act of 1996, 18 F.CCR. 13,620, 13,627 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial] (relying 
on and quoting this language). 
B Part III examines the FCC's inconsistencies in determining what constitutes a 
voice. Compare Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 403 ("The Commission 
determined that broadcast television, daily and weekly newspapers, radio, and 
Internet (via cable connection and DSL, dial-up, or other connections) are the relevant 
contributors to viewpoint diversity in local markets."), with Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 164 
("[T]he Commission ... limit[ed] 'voices' to broadcast television involving the 
'unresolved questions about the extent to which [non-broadcast] alternatives are 
widely accessible and provide meaningful substitutes to broadcast stations.'" (quoting 
Review of the Comm'n's Regulations Governing Television Broad., 14 F.CCR. 
12,903, 12,919 (1999))). 
9 This Article distinguishes between "local news" and "local political news." For 
instance, human interest stories do not further core political First Amendment values. 
Indeed, local news' seeming obsession with crime may harm public discourse and 
democratic function, as Jerry Kang has forcefully and creatively argued. See generally 
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489,1495 (2005) ("[T]he FCC 
has recently redefined the public interest so as to encourage the production of 
programming that makes us more biased."). 
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aimed at the media market's median taste,lO and (3) the degree to 
which media markets are contiguous with particular geographic and 
political boundaries can determine the level of output of political 
news. ll While this type of research is still in its infancy, it must gUide 
FCC regulation. 
This Article aims to add the inSights of political economy to the 
academic commentary about media ownership. On one side of the 
current debate are commentators who advocate "democracy-based" or 
"social value" regulation and support ownership regulation to enhance 
democratic values. Opposing them are market-based commentators 
who argue that the media should carry content that most appeals to 
viewers as measured by market behavior and who see no need, beyond 
antitrust enforcement, for media ownership regulation. 12 If people 
10 Peter ]. Alexander &: Keith Brown, Policy Making and Policy Tradeoffs: 
Broadcast Media Regulation in the United States, in THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF 
BROADCASTING MARKETS 255, 258-59, 272 (Paul Seabright &: Juergen von Hagen, eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (" 1M] edia firms face large up-front fixed costs and 
constant (and often low) marginal costs. Any given program or content therefore 
required an audience large enough to cover these up-front fixed costs .... " (citing 
Michael Spence &: Bruce Owen, Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and 
Welfare, 91 Q.]. Econ. 103 (1977))). 
II See infra Part IV. 
12 Compare PETER HUBER, LAw AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND 
LET COMMON LAw RULE THE TELECOSM 3-9, 206 (1997) ("In the telecosm ... 
commission law leads society down the road to serfdom . . . . From markets and 
common law, by contrast, there emerges spontaneous order that is rational, efficient, 
and intelligent."), THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER &: LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING 
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 45 (1994) ("IWle doubt the wisdom and utility of these 
diversity-based roles for the FCC's implementation of the public interest standard. In 
our judgment, arguments that the Commission should assume such roles 
underestimate the values served by competition among broadcasters, overestimate the 
FCC's capacity for wisdom and beneficence, and sanction dangerous degrees of 
government control over the flow of information."), Mark S. Fowler &: Daniel L. 
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 230-33 
(1982) ("IMlarketplace forces can and indeed do, affect the success or failure of 
television programming"), Bruce M. Owen, Regulatory Reform: The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the FCC Media Ownership Rules, 2003 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 671, 698 (" IAlntitrust merger enforcement in economic markets for advertiSing 
and other media services will tend to stop ownership concentration long before it 
becomes a threat to competition in the broader marketplace of ideas. Moreover, even 
if the FCC believed, erroneously, that the popularity of a given medium should be 
given weight in assessing competition in the marketplace of ideas, antitrust 
enforcement already accomplishes this."), Daniel E. Troy, Advice to the New President 
on the FCC and Communications Policy, 24 HARV.].L. &: PuB. POL'y 503, 521-23 (200l) 
(advocating "the rewards of deregulation" and claiming that FCC "has closed its eyes 
to economic reality and continued to cling to the past"), Christopher S. Yoo, 
Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (2005) (noting 
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want yet another degrading reality dating show, it is not the 
government's job to give them The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.13 
Democracy-based commentators tend to see ownership restrictions as 
an end unto themselves and fail to connect them to any quantifiable 
social or political goal. 14 They therefore do not offer prescriptions as 
to the size and nature of ownership restrictions and often seem to 
argue for media deconcentration and viewpoint diversity for their own 
sake. At the same time, market-based commentators treat media 
consumption as any other good, failing to recognize the role it plays in 
effective democracy. Viewing regulation as a tool to improve the 
agency relationship between citizens and elected officials connects 
quantifiable social goals to an economic framework. 15 
Last, this Article's prescriptions apply to today's media, one that will 
still be with us for a decade or so, but which will transform in the face 
of blogs, YouTube, and increasingly pervasive and powerful Internet 
applications. The Internet changes the cost structure and geographic 
shape of media, creating an entirely different set of regulatory 
"FCC's structural regulations ... tend to reduce the overall quantity and quality of 
media programming"), and Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-
Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 276-77 (2003) (same) 
[hereinafter Yoo, Rise and Demise] (arguing that FCC's media-specific regulation 
constituted incoherent approach to First Amendment in addition to being inefficient), 
with ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, & DEMOCRACY: THE 
BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935, at 6 (1993) ("The nature 
of the control and structure of the mass media is an explicitly political issue that 
should be the subject of public discussion."), CASS SUN STEIN , DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 151 (1993), C. Edwin Baker, Media Structure, Ownership 
Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAl. L. REv. 733, 734-39 (2005) (FCC's 
structural regulation furthers "fairer, more democratic allocation of communications 
power"), and Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of 
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2004) 
(arguing for "new class of cyberlawyers, who understand the import of technological 
design on free speech"), Ronald]. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, 
Enhancing the Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace Of Ideas, 2000 
U. ILl. L. REV. 813 (2000) (arguing that deconcentration of media best protects 
ideological diversity), Uli Levi, Reflections on the FCC's Recent Approach to Structural 
Regulation of the Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.]. 581, 582-94 (2000) 
(demonstrating that FCC's deregulatory agenda coexists with regulatory 
counterweight including self-regulation). 
13 Some have recognized the need for dialogue between the camps. Robert 
Entman & Steven Wildman, Reconciling Economic and Non-Economic Perspectives on 
Media Policy: Transcending the "Marketplace of Ideas," 42]. COMM. 5, 14 (1992). 
14 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 23-27. 
15 This project is akin to that outlined by Uli Levi to "experiment with structural 
regulations designed to promote journalistic values." Uli Levi, In Search of Regulatory 
Equilibrium, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1321,1323 (2007). 
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challenges. The new Internet media may cater to more individualized 
and fractured tastes, ignore local, state, and federal political 
institutions, and be even more beholden to the goals of advertisers 
who, of course, constitute broadcasters' revenue source. 16 Faced with 
this media dystopia, Professor Cass Sunstein and others have 
suggested direct government subsidies for news productionY To 
avoid the politicization of news reporting, which direct government 
subsidies might easily induce, this Article suggests that the 
government should encourage political news coverage by treating it as 
a charitable or artistic activity, with tax exemptions for entities that 
produce such news services and tax deductions for those who 
subscribe to these services. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly outlines the FCC's 
current ownership regulation. Part II analyzes its endemic failures 
before the U.s. Courts of Appeals. It argues this failure stems from the 
intractability of "viewpoint diversity" as a regulatory concept which, 
in turn, stems from a "Holmesian" vision of the First Amendment. 
Part III examines why diversity fails as a regulatory concept. Part IV 
presents a new basis for media ownership regulation: agency theory 
and monitoring costs. It briefly reviews the social scientific evidence 
connecting media industry structure with media output and political 
activity. Part IV also shows how some of these inSights can be applied 
to ownership regulatory questions. Part V argues for a unified 
standard of review of media ownership regulation, one that recognizes 
16 For an analysis of how advertiser-driven media can affect media content, see C. 
Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 341 (1997). For 
an analysis of how conglomeration can affect local broadcasters power and control, 
see Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communications Commission's 
National Television Ownership Cap: What's Bad for Broadcasting is Good for the 
Country, 46 WM. &: MARY L. REV. 439, 443 (2004). 
17 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 94, 121 (W. Lance 
Bennett &: Robert M. Entman eds., 2002); SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 86, 114-18 
(discussing the "aggresSive strategy ... to impose a tax on advertising proceeds from 
the newspaper or broadcasting industry as a whole and to use the proceeds to 
subsidize programming"); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001); c. Edwin Baker, 
Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FlA. L. REv. 839, 902-13 (2002) 
[hereinafter Baker, Media Concentration]; C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens 
Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1998) [hereinafter Baker, Media That Citizens Need]; 
Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, 
and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1391-92, 1461-65 
(2004) ("The use of subsidies, in the form of cash or non-cash incentives, permits 
government to pursue media political goals across all media and with far less 
formidable First Amendment constraints."). For a discussion of this intellectual 
divide, see Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law and Mass Media Regulation: Can 
Merger Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 372-74 (2006). 
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its inherently political, rather than economic, nature. Finally, Part VI 
looks to the future - a media future with economic incentives very 
different from today's. 
I. THE FCC's REGULATION OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP: A BRIEF HISTORY 
AND INTRODUCTION 
The Communications Act of 1934 requires the FCC to distribute 
rights to use the broadcast spectrum in a manner that serves "the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity."18 The public interest 
standard is the "touchstone for the exercise of the Commission's 
authority."19 Pursuant to this authority, the FCC has restricted media 
ownership in radio almost since the agency's inception over seventy 
years ago, preventing one individual or firm from owning "too many" 
radio stations. 2o The FCC nearly always considered furthering 
diversity in ownership as a goal in awarding radio licenses, and later 
applied this principle to television broadcast licenses.21 The history of 
these limits is one of convoluted political accommodations rather than 
theorized regulation. The following is not intended to be an 
exhaustive account of each turn and wriggle in this regulatory history, 
but rather a brief introduction to the significant regulatory trends, 
setting forth the current state of important media regulations. 
One of the FCC's earliest efforts to restrict media ownership 
illustrates the haphazard and politicized nature of media ownership 
regulation. In a note to his FCC chairman, James L. Fly, President 
Roosevelt wrote simply: "Will you let me know when you propose to 
have a hearing on newspaper ownership of radio stations. "22 Roosevelt 
carried an animus against newspapers in general, which he believed 
18 Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C § 310(d) (2000). 
19 FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). 
20 See generally Enrique Armijo, Public AirWaves, Private Mergers: Analyzing the 
FCC's Faulty Justifications for the 2003 Media Ownership Rule Changes, 82 N.C l. REV. 
1482, 1485 (2004) (FCC acknowledging that "limiting horizontal consolidation of 
ownership ... is the most reliable means of promoting 'viewpoint diversity"'); Loy A. 
Singleton &: Steven C Rockwell, Silent Voices: Analyzing the FCC "Media Voices" 
Criteria Limiting Local Radio-Television Cross-Ownership, 8 COMM. l. &: POL'y 385, 387 
(2003) ("At its inception, the Communications Act of 1934 provided the [FCCl with 
authority to regulate concentrations of [medial ownership in the public interest."). 
21 See LUCAS A. POWE,jR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 68-
74,78 (1987). 
22 Id. at 72. 
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opposed and effectively undermined much of his New Deal legislation. 
Thus, he hoped to limit newspaper ownership of radio stations. 23 
Fly never achieved the goal of explicitly prohibiting newspaper 
acquisition of broadcast stations (a prohibition that had to wait for 
President Nixon, another chief executive who had issues with 
newspapers). Rather, the FCC used diversification of ownership 
informally on a case-by-case basis, laying the groundwork for adoption 
of an across-the-board rule. In general, the FCC's rules, as the 
following section briefly describes, followed a tortuous path of 
unofficial licensing practices that developed into formal rules and then 
changed again under various political pressures. 
A. The Origins of Radio and Television Limits 
In 1938, the FCC imposed a strong, informal presumption against 
granting licenses that would create radio duopolies within the same 
market and service band (FM or AM). 24 This presumption against 
local duopoly ownership became an absolute in 1940 when the 
Commission adopted the rule prohibiting common ownership of two 
FM stations25 and, in 1943, two AM stations with similar service 
areas. 26 At the same time that the FCC adopted FM limits, it limited 
the infant television industry by restricting the number of stations 
under common ownership to three. 27 
23 ERIK BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 170 (1968). 
24 Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.C.C. 183, 186 (1938); see also Herbert H. Howard, 
Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory HiStory, 27 FED. COMM. L.J. 1,4 (1974). 
25 See In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of Comm'n's Rules Relating to 
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM ESt Television Broad. Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 19-23 
(1984) [hereinafter Multiple Ownership] (describing history of limits); see also In re 
Revision of Radio Rules ESt Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2761 (1992) (Final Report and 
Order); In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 ESt 73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules 
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, ESt Television Broad. Stations, 22 
F.C.C.2d 339, 346 (1970) (First Report and Order). 
26 See 1944 FCC TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 10-11 (1944); In re Amendment of 
Sections 3.35, 3.240 ESt 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple 
Ownership of AM, FM ESt Television Broad. Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288, 295-96 (1953) 
(Report and Order). Typically, television and radio spectrum is allocated 
geographically by "community." These allocation correspond to the Nielsen 
Company's "Designated Market Areas" ("DMAs"), which broadcasters and advertisers 
use to sell airtime. 
27 See Multiple Ownership, 100 F.C.C.2d at 21-22. 
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In 1941, the FCC passed the first national ownership limits, the 
Chain Broadcasting Rules. 2s These rules were some of the FCC's 
earliest media regulations. Upheld in a landmark case, National 
Broadcasting Co. v. United States,29 the Chain Broadcasting Rules 
mostly regulated the large national radio networks, CBS and NBC, in 
their behavior with regard to local stations, in particular, the networks' 
control of individual broadcasters' decisions. These regulations also 
included a structural ownership rule limiting a radio network from 
owning more than one broadcast station within a market area, 
reflecting the Commission's earlier presumption that a single entity 
holding more than one broadcast license in the same community 
contravened public interest.3D 
On the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in National 
Broadcasting Co., the FCC passed further structural regulations 
limiting national ownership of radio. The FCC prohibited FM radio 
station owners from owning more than six stations nationally in order 
to "obviate possible monopoly, and encourage local initiative. "31 In 
1946, the Commission placed a de facto national limit of seven on the 
ownership of AM stations by denying a CBS application for an eighth 
AM station.32 In the 1950s, the FCC, building on this informal 
practice and expanding it to the new technology of television, adopted 
what became known as the "Rule of Seven," which limited common 
ownership to seven FM, seven AM, and seven TV stations nationally 
(up to five of which could be VHF stations).33 The Rule of Seven 
remained in place for roughly thirty years until the FCC liberalized 
the limit to twelve in the 1980s.34 
28 Federal Commc'n. Comm'n, Report on Chain Broadcasting 65 (1941); 41 
CF.R. §§ 3.101-.108 (1941). 
29 319 U.s. 190, 206-08, 224-27 (1943). These rules also prohibit one firm 
owning two networks. Id. 
30 See Genesee Radio Corp., 5 F.CC 183,186-87 (1938). 
31 Multiple Ownership, 100 F.CC2d at 21 (quoting FEDERAL COMMUNICATlONS 
COMMISSION, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 68 (1940)); see also FEDERAL COMMUNICATlONS 
COMMISSION, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1941) (limiting TV stations under common 
ownership to three). 
32 In re Sherwood B. Brunton, 11 F.CC 407, 413 (1946). 
33 In re Amendment of Sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and 
Regulations Relating to the Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. 
Stations, 18 F.CC 288, 294, 297 (1953) (adopting ownership limit on AM stations). 
In this order, the limit was set at five television stations. One year later, it was 
changed to seven. See Report and Order, 43 F.CC 2797, 2798, 2800-01 (1954). 
34 Multiple Ownership, 100 F.CC2d at 55 (adding additional requirement that 
12-station group reach no more than 25% of national audience). 
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B. Cross-Ownership Restrictions 
In addition to national and local limits on the number of stations 
one entity could control, the FCC continued to impose various cross-
ownership rules limiting one entity's ownership or control of more 
than one type of media within a local market. In 1970, the FCC 
adopted its prohibition of cross-media ownership between FM radio 
stations and television stations within the same market.35 The FCC 
under the Nixon Administration prohibited newspaper cross-
ownership of radio or television stations.36 When the Commission 
adopted the rule, it grandfathered newspaperlbroadcast combinations 
in many markets, forcing divestitures only in highly concentrated 
markets. As a result, approximately seventy grandfathered 
newspaperlbroadcast combinations continue to exist today.37 
Until the early 1990s, the FCC entirely prohibited common 
ownership of multiple AM or FM stations within the same market. In 
1989, the FCC adopted a presumptive waiver policy to permit certain 
radiofIV combinations.38 In 1999, the FCC further relaxed its rule, 
allowing radiofIV combinations under certain conditions primarily 
involving the existence of at least eight independently owned media 
voices. 39 
C. Deregulation, Local and National Caps, and the Introduction of 
Audience Caps 
This regulatory patchwork remained largely intact until Chairman 
Mark Fowler, a Reagan appointee, initiated numerous liberalizations. 
Under Fowler's leadership, the Commission relaxed both the local 
limits and the national caps. In 1984, the FCC raised the station cap 
for FM, AM, and television from seven to twelve stations with the 
stated intent to eventually eliminate it altogether, an intention not 
fully realized to date. 40 The FCC balanced this deregulation, however, 
35 In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 & 73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules 
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM & Television Broad. Stations, 22 
F.C.C.2d 306, 309 (1970) (First Report and Order). 
36 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (2007). 
37 S.REP.No.108-141,at5(2003). 
38 Id. 
39 See id.; 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (2007). 
40 Multiple Ownership, 100 F.C.C.2d at 17, 55. The 12-station limit was intended 
as a transitional regulation until the limitation was eliminated entirely. However, 
Congress blocked the FCC's efforts for complete elimination, leaving the 12-station 
limit in place. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. 
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with new types of restrictions - limits on the size of the audience that 
anyone media firm could reach. Specifically, when the Commission 
raised the limit on television, FM, and AM radio common ownership 
to twelve each, it also prohibited anyone entity from owning or 
controlling television stations that in total reached 25% of the national 
audience.41 
D. Statutory Revision 
In the 1990s, Congress began to legislate particular media 
ownership limits, some deregulatory, others regulatory. Cable 
television, whose reach the FCC had limited to protect broadcasting, 
gained much greater penetration by the late 1980s and attracted 
regulatory attention. Pursuant to the 1992 Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act, the FCC limited anyone 
cable system's reach to 30% of national cable ownership and restricted 
the degree of integration with program providers.42 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act43 Signaled Congress's even 
deeper involvement in setting media ownership limits.44 The Act 
eliminated the twelve television station rule, raising the number of 
television stations one entity could control to 35% of national cable 
ownership. Second, it eliminated the national cap on radio 
ownership.45 Third, it instructed the Commission to conduct biennial 
rulemaking proceedings "to determine whether to retain, modify, or 
eliminate its limitation on the number of television stations that a 
person may own in . . . the same television market. "46 This led to 
several attempts by the FCC to revise all of these caps and numerous 
challenges to these efforts, in particular the Sinclair, Fox Television, 
and Prometheus Radio cases discussed below. As a result of these 
Cir. 2002). 
41 In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Comm'n's Rules Relating to 
Multiple Ownership of AM, FM &: Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 74, 76 
(1984). The 12-station limit was intended as a transitional regulation until the limit 
was removed entirely. Congress blocked the FCC's efforts at complete elimination, 
leaving the 12-station limit. 
42 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, 47 U.s.C. 
§ 533(f)(1)(A) (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 76.503 (2007). 
43 47 U.s.c. § 202(c)(l)(B) (2000). 
44 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-lO4, 110 Stat. 56. 
45 47 U.s.C. § 202(a), 202(c)(l)(B) (2007). 
46 47 U.s.c. § 202(c)(2). Note that Congress has since modified this provision to 
call for quadrennial as opposed to biennial reviews. See Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99-lO0. 
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cases, most of these regulations remain in flux on remand to the FCC 
for further consideration. 
E. Current Status of Rules 
The most important restrictions either currently in force or involved 
in a remand before the FCC include: 
• The national television multiple ownership rule, which caps the 
number of television stations a Single entity may own 
nationwide;47 
• The national cable ownership rule, which limits the size of cable 
systems and their degree of integration with program 
providers;48 
• The local television multiple ownership rule, which limits the 
number of stations a single entity may own in a local viewing 
market· 49 , 
• The radio/television cross-ownership rule, which limits joint 
holdings among those media within a given media market 
subject to the 1999 thresholds;50 
• The dual network rule, which prohibits combinations among 
the four major TV networks;51 
• The newspaper/broadcast rule, which limits cross-ownership of 
television stations and daily newspapers within the same local 
media. 52 and , 
• The local radio ownership rule, which governs the amount of 
consolidation permissible in a local listening market. 53 
47 See 47 CF.R. § 73.3555(e) (2007) (overruled by Congress, Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99-100. 
48 Communications Act of 1934 § 613(f)(l)(A), (47 U.s.C § 533(f)(l)(A) 
(2000)); 47 CF.R. § 76.503, reprinted in 47 u.s.C § 533(f)(l)(B) (2000). 
49 See 47 CF.R. § 73.3555(b). 
50 See id. § 73.3555(c). 
51 See id. § 73.658(g) (2007). Analysis of this rule is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
52 See id. § 73.3555(c). 
53 See id. § 73.3555(a). See generally CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, FCC MEDIA 
OWNERSHIP RULES: CURRENT STATUS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2006), available at 
hup:llitaly.usembassy.gov/pdfJotherIRUI925.pdf (describing rule and various rule 
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Of course, the development of these rules did not occur solely 
within the FCC and Congress. They have also responded to judicial 
review and analysis. As discussed below, the judicial reaction to these 
rules is particularly important, given that virtually all of them have 
been vacated or remanded to the FCC. Any set of rules the FCC now 
creates must respond to these judicial critiques. 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FCC'S MEDIA OWNERSHIP ORDERS: THE 
LONG LIFE, BUT INEVITABLE FAILURE, OF THE HOLMESIAN METAPHOR 
For the half century demarcated by two cases - National 
Broadcasting Co. in the 1940S54 and National Citizens Committee for 
Broadcasting55 in the 1970s - media ownership rules remained 
uncontroversial and unchallenged. These cases gave the FCC great 
discretion in setting limits on media ownership and accepted its 
justification that such limits furthered diversity in political discourse. 
Further, as examined below, these cases recognized any restriction 
that furthered diversity, even in marginal ways or with little evidence, 
as rational or reasonable. 
Perhaps more importantly, they created a powerful metaphor: 
viewing media regulation as the antitrust law of the marketplace of 
ideas. In National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, the Court, 
quoting the pivotal antitrust case of Associated Press v. United States, 
stated: 
Our past decisions have recognized, moreover, that the First 
Amendment and antitrust values underlying the Commission's 
diversification policy may properly be considered by the 
Commission in determining where the public interest lies. 
"IT] he 'public interest' standard necessarily invites reference 
to First Amendment principles," and, in particular, to the First 
Amendment goal of achieving "the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic 
sources. "56 
While not specifically citing Holmes's vision of the First 
Amendment as a marketplace of ideas,57 the Court's reference to 
changes). 
54 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.s. 190,224 (1943). 
55 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.s. 775, 796 (1978). 
56 rd. at 795 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 
U.s. 94, 122 (1973); and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,20 (1944)). 
57 This was famously set forth in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.s. 616, 630 
HeinOnline -- 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1562 2007-2008
1562 University of California, Davis [Vol. 41:1547 
"diverse and antagonistic" sources seems to reference that concept. 58 
Other cases involving media regulation are more explicit. For 
instance, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,59 Justice White wrote: 
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will 
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization 
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a 
private licensee. "Speech concerning public affairs is more 
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." It is 
the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences 
which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be 
abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.60 
Indeed, the FCC's own statements about the purpose of viewpoint 
diversity and media regulation explicitly reference this metaphor. In 
its 2003 Biennial Review Order, the FCC cites Associated Press: 
Viewpoint diversity refers to the availability of media content 
reflecting a variety of perspectives. A diverse and robust 
marketplace of ideas is the foundation of our democracy. 
Consequently, "it has long been a basic tenet of national 
communications policy that the widest possible dissemination 
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is 
essential to the welfare of the public." This policy is given 
effect, in part, through regulation of broadcast ownership.61 
(1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
58 Contemporaries recognized the power and likely influence of Holmes's 
marketplace of ideas metaphor. Felix Frankfurter wrote, "It is not reckless prophecy 
to assume that his famous dissenting opinion in the Abrams case will live as long as 
English prose retains its power to move." FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 54-55 (1938). The role of the metaphor has been recognized 
in media ownership, though never questioned. See Robert B. Horwitz, On Media 
Concentration and the Diversity Question, in MEOlA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING 
AND METRICS 9, 12 (Philip Napoli ed., 2007). 
59 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Contemporary legal 
commentary certainly viewed media ownership regulation as informed by antitrust 
principles. See, e.g., Emmanual Cellar, Antitrust Problems in the Television 
Broadcasting Industry, 22 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROBS. 549, 570 (1957) (arguing that 
antitrust principles argue for media ownership restriction and certain behavioral 
remedies). 
60 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.s. at 389-90 (internal citations omitted). 
61 2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,627 (2003). Most of the work for the 
2002 Biennial was, in fact, conducted in 2002, but the Order was passed in 2003. 
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Philip Napoli has analyzed the FCC's extensive use of the metaphor 
in its decision making in a study examining every FCC use of the 
metaphor over the last sixty years in rulemaking, orders, and other 
administrative promulgations.62 He concluded that it "remains one of 
the most prominent metaphors in communications policy ... [that] 
has factored into the decisions of the Federal Communication 
Commission .... ,,63 He showed that the FCC has used the metaphor 
in particular for ownership decisions, justifying both regulatory and 
deregulatory efforts.64 
The marketplace of ideas metaphor most likely has had such power 
because, it might be reasoned, just as inefficient firms do not survive, 
bad ideas are also discarded. Certainly, in science, bad theories are 
abandoned as they are falsified. Similarly, though perhaps depending 
upon one's philosophical commitments, one might see moral and legal 
progress in the same way. After all, we have abandoned the bad ideas 
of the divine right of kings, slavery, and disenfranchisement of women 
in favor of the good ideas of democracy, human rights, equality 
between the sexes and among the races. 
The metaphor collapses, however, when applied to media ownership 
regulation. This regulation creates a sort of antitrust regime of the 
marketplace of ideas or viewpoints that aims to guarantee "enough" 
voices so as to create a well-performing market of ideas. The market's 
normative standards simply do not work well with the production of 
viewpoints. The market's primary normative standard, the allocative 
efficiency standard, identifies the ideal level of output given aggregate 
demand and total willingness to produce.65 Monopoly is to be avoided 
because it creates conditions of suboptimal output. A market 
"performs" well when its output approaches the output achieved 
under ideal competitive conditions.66 
Identifying an optimal output in viewpoints is a far more fraught 
endeavor. It seems absurd to talk about a "well-performing" 
marketplace of ideas. While more viewpoints are perhaps better than 
62 PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND 
PROCESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 110 (2001). 
63 ld. at 12l. 
64 ld. at 121-23. 
65 Allocative efficiency is therefore a central norm for public policy with utilitarian 
moral commitments. Competitive markets with numerous firms most often achieve 
this norm, though it can occur in markets with few firms in situations characterized 
by Bertrand equilibrium or contestable markets. LuiS M. B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 26-27 (2000). 
66 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91-101 
(1993). 
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fewer, the market's efficiency standard does not tell you when there are 
"enough" viewpoints, given that both their cost of production and 
utility is obscure. Some economists, when examining research and 
development, attempt to isolate the ideal levels of investment for new 
products or scientific discovery, but their insights do not apply well to 
viewpoints.67 The value of scientific or commercial innovations 
applicable to commercial products has an identifiable value: decrease 
in production cost or increase in consumers' willingness to buy a 
product that incorporates these innovations. An additional viewpoint, 
however, has no such recognizable value. Thus, the price (or y-axis in 
the typical supply and demand curve) cannot be defined for the 
marketplace of ideas. Further, given the difficulty of quantifying 
viewpoints, it is impossible to define optimal output. Therefore, the 
"antitrust" of the marketplace of ideas is a project that will never get off 
the ground. In other words, the output (or x-axis in the typical supply 
and demand curve) cannot be defined for the marketplace of ideas. 
Not surprisingly, the precedents of National Broadcasting Co. and 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, while never officially 
overruled, have bowed under the weight of their contradictions. The 
dam began to crack with Judge Richard Posner's 1993 opinion in 
Schurz v. FCC, which struck down the FCC's financial syndication 
rules. 68 As discussed below, Posner was the first to question the 
relationship, axiomatically accepted by earlier courts, between 
diversity of ownership and diversity of viewpoint. More important, 
his approach to the reasonability standard of the Administrative 
Procedure Act ("APA") also pointed to a new direction. 69 Rather than 
uphold a regulation that attempted to further diversity of viewpoint on 
the basis of questionable assumptions and vague economic theory, 
Posner demanded actual proof that a given ownership restriction 
would lead to a more diverse output. 70 
Section 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act led to further 
judicial questioning of these regulations. This section required the 
67 See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94]. POL 
ECON. 1002, 1002-04 (1986) (exploring, from theoretical perspective, optimal 
investment in research). 
68 Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1055 (7th Cir. 1992). 
69 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, "the agency must examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.s. 29,43 (1983). 
70 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1050 (" [Tlhe Commission's articulation of its grounds is 
not adequately reasoned. Key concepts are left unexplained, key evidence is 
overlooked .... "). 
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FCC to review and defend its broadcast ownership limits every two 
years. 71 Broadcasters appealed the resulting "Biennial Reviews," which 
for the most part defended and maintained the regulations, to the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which at that time was 
dominated by judges appointed by Republican presidents. Like 
Schurz, these opinions - Fox Television Stations v. FCCn and Sinclair 
Broadcasting Group v. FCC73 - never questioned the First Amendment 
principles in National Broadcasting Co. and National Citizens 
Committee for Broadcasting, typically ruling that the FCC regulations 
were acceptable under the First Amendment. 74 Rather, they struck 
down these regulations under the APA's arbitrary and capricious 
standard, finding unacceptable the FCC's assumption that any 
regulation that de-concentrates ownership axiomatically furthers 
diversity. 75 
The FCC consolidated the remands of these cases, along with 
several other proceedings, in its 2003 Biennial Ownership Regulation 
Order. Under the leadership of Michael Powell, the FCC attempted to 
use the order as an opportunity not to defend, but to liberalize these 
rules. Prometheus Radio v. FCC rejected those efforts and remanded 
for further consideration, largely using the same type of analysis in 
Fox Television and Sinclair.76 It ruled that the FCC failed to use 
coherent definitions of viewpoint diversity, but this time rejected the 
FCC's liberalization, not its defense, of ownership regulations. The 
Prometheus Radio remand is currently before the FCC. 77 
Contrary to the bulk of scholarship on these cases, the growing 
disfavor with which courts view the FCC's orders do not stem 
primarily or exclusively from a conservative use of the First 
Amendment to limit government regulation. 78 While it is true that 
71 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h), Pub. L. No. lO4-lO4, llO Stat. 56 
(1996) (codified as amended in 47 U.s.C § 161 (2000)). 
72 Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045-47 (D.C Cir. 2002). 
73 Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 167-69 (D.C Cir. 2002). 
74 ld. at 169; Fox, 280 F.3d at 1047. 
75 Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 165; Fox, 280 F.3d at 1045. 
76 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 435 (3d Cir. 2004). 
77 In re 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Comm'n's Broad. 
Ownership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. 
Act of 1996, 21 F.CCR. 8834 (2006). 
78 Balkin, supra note 12, at 27-28 (2004) ("We are living through a Second Gilded 
Age, which ... comes complete with its own reconstruction of the meaning of liberty 
and property. Freedom of speech is becoming a generalized right against economic 
regulation of the information industries."); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: 
Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. 
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appellate panels consisting of Republican appointees have ruled in 
most of these cases, this conventional wisdom is hard to maintain in 
light of Prometheus Radio, in which two judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents attacked the FCC's diversity analysis to strike 
down liberalizations of media regulation. These regulations do not fail 
exclusively because of courts' ideologies, but rather because of the 
FCC's notion of viewpoint diversity, which is simply too malleable 
and vague a standard. This standard functions as a useful target for 
courts that want to strike down either the FCC's defense of media 
ownership regulation or its liberalization. 
A. Making the Metaphor: National Broadcasting Co., Red Lion, and 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting 
At first blush, the Constitution would seem to bar the federal 
government's efforts to restrict ownership of radio and television 
broadcast stations, because such regulations limit the freedom of the 
press and speech. However, two cases separated by almost forty 
years - National Broadcasting Co. v. United States and FCC v. National 
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting - set forth the reasoning, at least 
ostensibly accepted to this day, for why these regulations survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.79 
In upholding the various restrictions of the Chain Broadcasting 
Rules, the Supreme Court in its 1941 decision in National Broadcasting 
Co. reasoned that the ability to broadcast is not a First Amendment 
right. Rather, Congress requires that broadcast licensees serve the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity. so The Court stated that 
"in the absence of governmental control the public interest might be 
PROBS. 173, 201 (2003) ("As the information economy and sOciety have moved to 
center stage, the First Amendment is increasingly used to impose judicial review on all 
regulation of this sphere of social and economic life."); Michael]. Burstein, Towards a 
New Standard for First Amendment Review of Structural Media Regulation, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1030, 1032 (2004) (arguing that "such Lochner-like scrutiny is inappropriate in 
media regulation cases"); Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.]. 
1359, 1443 (2005) ("The shield protecting ordinary economic regulation from First 
Amendment scrutiny has worn thin. The doctrinal distinction may not withstand the 
sheer amount of money in contemporary communications."); Glen O. Robinson, The 
Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.]. 899,944 (1998) 
("[TJhe First Amendment has become the first line of challenge for virtually all forms 
of regulatory initiatives .... "). 
79 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 798-803 (1978); Nat'l 
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943). 
80 47 U.s.c. §§ 307(a), 310(d), 312 (2000). 
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subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field. "81 
The Court characterized the FCC's role as "encourag[ing] the 
larger ... use of radio in the public interest [by] mak[ing] special 
regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain 
broadcasting. "82 
Faced with a First Amendment challenge to these broadcast 
regulations, the Court reasoned that the heightened judicial scrutiny 
of regulation of speech should not apply because there is no First 
Amendment right to use the broadcast spectrum.83 The Court 
accepted the goal of reducing monopolistic control and encouraging 
diversity of ownership as a reasonable condition for the use of the 
spectrum and treated this type of regulation as primarily economic 
and therefore entitled to a deferential standard of review.84 The Court 
upheld the regulation because it found that restricting· network 
ownership in this fashion was a reasonable way to further this goaI.Bs 
The next major challenge to media ownership regulation occurred 
thirty years later in 1974. Chairman Fly had enforced the FCC's 
newspaper cross-ownership prohibition informally on a case-by-case 
basis until the 1970s. During license application proceedings, the 
FCC simply applied an unofficial policy of withholding licenses from 
publishers who sought to diversify their holdings into broadcasting.86 
This informal policy of refUSing to award TV licenses to newspapers 
was challenged at least once, but was upheld.87 
The Department of Justice's ("DO]") actions in 1973 motivated the 
FCC's formal adoption of the cross-ownership prohibition - a story 
that illustrates well how politics affects media ownership decisions.88 
81 Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 219 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Corp., 309 
U.S. 134, 137 (1940)). 
82 Id. at 217 (quoting 47 U.S.c. § 303 (2000)). 
83 Id. at 226-27 (" [TJhe right of free speech does not include, however, the right to 
use facilities of radio without a license."). 
&I Id. at 227. 
85 Id. at 225. 
86 Howard, supra note 24, at 15-17, 19-20 ("A bitter controversy raged over the 
tendency of the FCC to withhold TV permits from publishers who sought to diversify 
their investments into the broadcasting field."). 
87 See McClatchey Broad. Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 
88 In 1973, the Antitrust Division brought numerous challenges to broadcast 
license renewals of stations cross-owned with daily newspapers. It Signaled its 
intentions in a letter. Letter from u.s. Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., to 
Sec'y, FCC (Nov. 28, 1973). Subsequently, it challenged numerous licenses. For a 
listing of those challenges, see Posting of Elliot Parker, 3ZLUFUR@CMUVM.BITNET, 
to AE]MC@CMUVM.BlTNET (Aug. 19, 1994), http://list.msu.edulcgibinlwa?A2= 
ind9408c&:L=aejmc&:P=302 ("Petition to Deny Renewal Application in the Matter of 
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For years, several midlevel attorneys at the DO], known in regulatory 
circles as "the mad dogs," had supported the idea of restricting cross-
ownership without success. 89 Sinclair Gearing, an attorney in the 
general litigation section of the antitrust division, reportedly said, "At 
lunch sometimes when I have a couple of drinks, I say that we're going 
to bust up cross-ownerships. "90 Cross-ownership restrictions, 
however, remained a bureaucratic prandial reverie. 
In 1974, the DO] surprised the Washington regulatory 
establishment (and perhaps Mr. Gearing as well) when it petitioned 
the FCC to deny broadcast licenses to certain corporate entities that 
owned newspapers.91 In response, the FCC adopted formal rules 
prohibiting cross-ownership.92 According to the Washington Post, 
there was no evidence of direct manipulation by the White House. In 
other words, the Post was left asking "Who let the mad dogs out?" 
Nonetheless, numerous figures, including FCC commissioners, 
claimed that the rules resulted from the Nixon Administration's 
interference - that they were motivated by the Administration's 
Cowles Communications, Inc., Des Moines, Iowa, for Renewal of Licenses of Stations 
KRNT, KRNT-FM, and KRNT-TV, Des Moines, Iowa, File Nos. BR-515, BRH-2813, 
and BRCT-246, 1/2/74. Petition to Deny Renewal Applications in the Matter of 
Pulitzer Publishing Co., St. Louis, Missouri, File Nos. BRCT-30 and BR 641, and 
Newhouse Broadcasting Corp., St. Louis, Missouri, for Renewal of License of 
KTVI(TV), St. Louis, Missouri, File No. BRCT-520, 1/2/74. Petition to Deny Renewal 
applications in the Matter of Midwest Radio-Television, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
for Renewal of Licenses of Stations WCCO, WCCO-FM, and WCCO-TV, File Nos. 
BR-659, BRH-2496 and BRCT-49, Before the FCC, 3/1174. Petition to Deny Renewal 
Applications in the Matter of Stauffer Publications, Inc., Topeka Kansas, for Renewal 
of Licenses of Stations WIBW, WlBW-FM and WIBW-TV, File Nos. BR-573, BRH-
1316 and BRCT-181, 5/1/74. Petition to Deny Renewal Applications in the Matter of 
KSL, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, for Renewal of Licenses of Stations KSL, KSL-FM and 
KSL-TV, 9/3174. Petition to Deny Renewal Applications in the Matter of McClatchy 
Newspaper for Renewal of Licenses of Stations KMJ, KMJ-FM and KMJ-TV, Fresno, 
California, File Nos. BR-7, BRH-538 and BRCT-166, 11/1174. Petition to Deny 
Renewal Applications in the Matter of KHQ, Inc. for Renewal of Licenses of KHQ, 
KHQ-FM and KHQ-TV, Spokane, Washington, File Nos. BR-76, BRH-1l7 and BRCT-
147,1/2/75."). 
89 See Susanna McBee, Justice Department Move on Media Surprised White House, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1974, at A2. 
90 Susanna McBee, Breaking Up Media: Justice Department Action Nonpolitical, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1974, at AI. 
91 See supra note 88. 
92 In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, &: 73.636 of the Comm'n's Rules 
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, F.M., &: Television Broad. Stations, 50 
F.C.C.2d 1046, 1074 (1975) (Second Report and Order). 
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hostility toward the press and its desire to punish newspapers for their 
role in the Watergate scandal.93 
Regardless of the peculiarities of their genesis, these rules were 
challenged before the Supreme Court in National Citizens Committee 
for Broadcasting. The Court reviewed them under the rational basis 
standard.94 Quoting Associated Press, Justice Marshall continued and 
strengthened Frankfurter's characterization of media ownership 
restrictions as protecting the number of firms in the media industry to 
preserve the marketplace of ideas, just as antitrust law protects the 
existence of multiple firms within an industry to preserve 
competition.95 Applying the rational basis standard applicable to run-
of-the-mill economic regulation, the Court accepted the FCC's 
assumption that any regulation which increases the number of media 
firms is reasonable and rational because the firms contribute to 
diversity and antagonism of viewpoints.96 
Indeed, the Court appeared to hold that any regulation which 
furthered diversity of ownership, at least in broadcast, would satisfy 
the standard of review under the APA. Responding to the First 
Amendment challenge, the Court ruled that the First Amendment 
does not protect the right to use the scarce medium of broadcast. 
Therefore, "efforts to enhanc[e] the volume and quality of coverage of 
public issues through regulation of broadcasting may be permissible 
where similar efforts to regulate the print media would not be. ,,97 
Further, the Court set forth a highly deferential standard for 
reviewing future FCC ownership regulation, requiring little proof to 
show that a given rule "enhance[s] the volume and quality of 
coverage," stating that the "pOSSible benefits of competition do not 
lend themselves to detailed forecast.,,98 In addition, it did not require 
conceptual clarity.99 
93 McBee, supra note 90; Editorial, The FCC's Ghostfrom Watergate, WASH. TiMES, 
Aug. 7,2003, at A18. 
94 FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.s. 775, 802-03 (1978) (citing 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,413-16 (1971». 
95 ld. at 795 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94, 122 (1973); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.s. 1,20 (1944». 
96 ld. at 796 "([N]otwithstanding the inconclusiveness of the rulemaking record, 
the Commission acted rationally in finding that diversification of ownership would 
enhance the possibility of achieving greater diversity of viewpoints."). 
97 ld. at 800 (internal citations omitted). 
98 ld. at 797 (quoting FCC v. RCA Commc'ns, Inc., 346 U.s. 86, 96 (1953». 
99 ld. at 796-97 ("Diversity and its effects are ... elusive concepts, not easily 
defined let alone measured without making qualitative judgments objectionable on 
both policy and First Amendment grounds." (quoting Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad. 
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B. The Metaphor Collapses: Schurz, Time Warner, and the 1996 
Telecommunications Act Cases 
Starting with Schurz v. FCC in 1993, appellate courts began to apply 
a stricter approach in every major review of media ownership orders, 
while ostensibly following the holdings in National Broadcasting Co. 
and National Citizen Committee jor Broadcasting. Abandoning the logic 
of these cases that any regulation which limits ownership furthers 
viewpoint diversity, these more recent opinions required media 
ownership regulation to define viewpoint diversity with specificity and 
show how any given ownership limit would, in fact, lead to a greater 
number of viewpoints. 100 This significantly raised the bar for the FCC. 
Adding an additional hurdle for the FCC, these post-National Citizen 
Committee jor Broadcasting courts often require that the FCC compare 
the cost of their ownership rule with the value of an increased number 
of viewpoints within the media, a difficult proposition given the 
inherent vagueness of defining viewpoint. 
l. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC 
In Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC,IOI an opinion authored by 
Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the FCC's 
financial interest and syndication C"FinSyn") rules, a set of rules that 
prohibited a television network from licensing its own programs for 
rebroadcast by independent stations or from purchasing syndication 
rights from independent producers. 102 The regulations required 
networks to sell syndication rights to an independent syndicator. 103 
The FCC feared that the networks would leverage their control of 
programming distribution into control of programming production. 
In 1991, an FCC order revised and promulgated these regulations 
v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938,961 (D.C Cir. 1977))). 
100 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402-03 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 162 (D.C Cir. 2002); Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, lO44-45 (D.C Cir. 2002). 
101 Schurz Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992). 
102 ld. at 1045. 
103 ld. (distinguishing between licensing of programming, which would entail 
ongoing revenues for network and be prohibited under regulations, and outright sale 
of programming, which would not give network interest in later revenues and was 
permitted). 
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again, and a broadcaster subsequently challenged that order. 104 Posner 
rejected the rules, stating: 
The concern behind the rules was that the networks, 
controlling as they did through their owned and operated 
stations and their affiliates a large part of the system for 
distributing television programs to American households, 
would unless restrained use this control to seize a dominating 
position in the production of television programs. That is, 
they would lever their distribution "monopoly" into a 
production "monopoly." ... The rules would strengthen the 
independent stations (and so derivatively the outside 
producers, for whom the independent stations were an 
important market along with the networks themselves) by 
securing them against having to purchase reruns from their 
competitors, the networks. \05 
The FCC's justification for the FinSyn rules was analogous to that 
for the Chain Broadcasting Rules and involved broadcasters' or radio 
networks' purported ability to use their market power to limit the 
types of programming they use by foreclosing independent providers. 
In particular, just as limiting ownership of national radio networks 
would limit networks' ability to dictate programming decisions to 
independent radio stations, the FinSyn rules would prevent the 
networks from using their bargaining power to demand syndication 
rights from independent television programming producers. In 
National Broadcasting Co., Justice Frankfurter simply accepted the 
justification that limits on networks' bargaining power were acceptable 
in the name of fostering competition in the media industry, thereby 
creating more viewpoint diversity. 106 
Posner disagreed. First, with a healthy Chicago School skepticism 
of antitrust foreclosure stories, he found it unlikely that networks 
would use their dominance in distribution to starve their competitors. 
He stated: "If the networks . . . refused to syndicate independent 
stations, they would be getting nothing in return for the money they 
had laid out for syndication rights except a long-shot chance -
104 Syndication & Financial Interest Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,242 (Fed. Commc'ns 
Comm'n June 6, 1991), reconsidered and affd by 56 Fed. Reg. 64,207 (Dec. 9, 1991) 
(amending 47 C.F.R §§ 73.622, 73.659, 73.3526 (1991)). 
105 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1045-46. 
106 Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,217-19 (1943). 
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incidentally, illegal under the antitrust laws - to weaken the already 
weak competitors of network stations." 107 
Further, he saw as inefficient any rule that limits the possibility of 
contract between producers and networks, arguing that such rules 
would prohibit beneficial agreements and that certain shows would 
not be profitable to produce at all if networks could not contract for a 
portion of the syndication rights. He wrote: 
If forbidden to buy syndication rights, networks would pay 
less for programs, so the outside producers would not come 
out clear winners - indeed many would be losers. 
Production for television is a highly risky undertaking, like 
wildcat drilling for gas and oil. ... The sale of syndication 
rights to a network would enable a producer to shift risk to a 
larger, more diversified entity presumptively better able to 
bear it. The resulting reduction in the risks of production 
would encourage new entry into production and thus give the 
independent stations a more competitive supply of programs. 
Evidence introduced in this proceeding showed that, 
consistent with this speculation, networks in the pre-1970 era 
were more likely to purchase syndication rights from small 
producers than from large ones. 108 
Posner concluded: "[T] he new rules ... appear to harm rather than 
help outside producers ... by redUcing their bargaining options. It is 
difficult to see how taking away a part of a seller's market could help 
the seller." 109 
Finally, Posner rejected the notion that diversity of ownership is an 
end unto itself, questioning whether strengthening independent 
programmers and stations would, in fact, lead to more diverse 
programming.llo He pOinted out, trotting out the famous 
HotellingiSteinerlll economic argument, that more concentrated 
107 Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1046. 
lOS ld. 
109 ld. at 1051. 
110 ld. at 1054. 
III The Hoteiling and Steiner models both address, from varying vantage points, 
the effect that market concentration has on choice. For a more detailed discussion of 
both models, consider Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 
(1929), and Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of 
Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952). 
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markets produce greater diversity, i.e., fewer owners lead to more 
views. 112 
It must be pointed out that Posner made theoretical economic 
arguments to counter the FCC's theoretical arguments. Neither side 
presented empirical evidence. Posner did not consider the alternate 
but possible mechanisms under which the FinSyn rules might do some 
good. For instance, he was no doubt correct that the FinSyn rules, by 
preventing the sale of syndication to the networks, might discourage 
independent production. However, he did not consider the possibility 
that networks' monopsonistic market position in relationship to 
producers might give them an undesirable degree of bargaining power. 
This power is exacerbated by the "hold up": the problem that content 
producers must incur Significant sunk costs to create pilot shows, with 
no guarantee of recouping these costs, simply to market their 
programs to networks. ll3 Such bargaining power might allow 
networks to force prices for syndication rights so low that independent 
producers' profits would suffer. This in turn might lead to fewer 
independent producers and possibly less content or lower quality 
programming. Producers, or indeed society as a whole, might do 
112 He continued: 
It has long been understood that monopoly in broadcasting could actually 
promote rather than retard programming diversity. If all the television 
channels in a particular market were owned by a single firm, its optimal 
programming strategy would be to put on a sufficiently varied menu of 
programs in each time slot to appeal to every substantial group of potential 
television viewers in the market, not just the largest group. For that would 
be the strategy that maximized the size of the station's audience. Suppose, as 
a simple example, that there were only two television broadcast frequencies 
(and no cable television), and that 90 percent of the viewers in the market 
wanted to watch comedy from 7 to 8 p.m. and 10 percent wanted to watch 
ballet. The monopolist would broadcast comedy over one frequency and 
ballet over the other, and thus gain 100 percent of the potential audience. If 
the frequencies were licensed to two competing firms, each firm would 
broadcast comedy in the 7 to 8 p.m. time slot, because its expected audience 
share would be 45 percent (one half of 90 percent), which is greater than 10 
percent. Each prime-time slot would be filled with "popular" programming 
targeted on the median viewer, and minOrity tastes would go unserved. 
Some critics of television believe that this is a fair description of prime-time 
network television. Each network vies to put on the most popular programs 
and as a result minority tastes are ill served. 
Schurz, 982 F.2d at 1054-55. 
113 For a sophisticated game theory analYSiS, see Nodir Adilov & Peter J. 
Alexander, Horizontal Merger: Pivotal Buyers and Bargaining Power, 91 ECON. LETTERS 
307 (2006). 
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better if only syndication firms and not networks could purchase these 
rights. 
Posner, while paying lip service to National Broadcasting Co. and 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, failed to follow their 
deferential standard. After all, it would be possible to envision a 
monopsonist story in which independent producers' bargaining power 
would increase if networks were barred from owning syndication 
rights. Posner's rational basis analysis required the FCC to justify its 
regulations in a way that he would find superior to other 
justifications.1l4 While it may very well be that Posner's preferred 
theory or economic scenario is more likely or probable, that does not 
mean the FCC was irrational. 
2. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC 
In Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC,ll5 the District of 
Columbia Circuit reviewed the FCC's national caps for cable 
ownershipY6 Section 11 (c) of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"),ll7 
requires the FCC, inter alia, to set "limits on the number of cable 
subscribers a person is authorized to reach through cable systems 
owned by such person, or in which such person has an attributable 
interest."1l8 Pursuant to the statute, the FCC prevents cable 
companies from having more than 30% of subscribers nationwide. 1l9 
The Commission supported this limit on the grounds that it 
"maximizes" the number of cable systems. "More MSOs [Multivideo 
System Operators, Le., cable companies] making purchasing decisions 
[will] increas[e] the likelihood that the MSOs will make different 
programming choices and a greater variety of media voices will 
therefore be available to the public." 120 
114 Indeed, Posner recognizes that his theory is just that, stating, "[T]his analysis 
and its bearing on competition in the program industry is speculative, theoretical, and 
may for all we know be all wet." Schurz, 982 F.2d at 105l. 
115 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
116 ld. at 1128. 
117 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified at 47 U.s.c. § 533 (2000». 
118 47 U.s.c. § 533(f)(l)(A) (2000). The vertical limits are not discussed here. See 
§ 533(f)(1)(8). 
119 Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1129 (citing Implementation of Section l1(c) of 
Cable Television Consumer Prot. &: Competition Act of 1992, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,098, 
19,1199155 (1999». 
120 ld. at 1l34-35 (citing Implementation of Section l1(c) of Cable Television 
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The cable companies, Time Warner and AT&T, challenged the limit 
as exceeding statutory authority, unconstitutionally infringing on their 
freedom of speech, and resulting from arbitrary and capricious 
decision-making in violation of the APA. l2l Agreeing with Time 
Warner and AT&T, the court rejected these limits, finding, inter alia, 
that the FCC's understanding of diversity was too flimsy. 122 
While the court sidestepped the issue of how much value the 
marginal voice has when weighed against the First Amendment, it 
ruled that under the applicable statute, diversity means a programmer 
is guaranteed only two possible outlets.123 The court remanded to the 
FCC on the grounds that ownership caps could be justified by the 
excess bargaining power they gave cable operators. 124 
3. Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCC 
Sinclair Broadcast involved the FCC's long-standing ban on one 
entity controlling more than one broadcast station in a particular 
media market. In the 1998 Local Ownership Order, the FCC relaxed 
this prohibition under certain conditions, including the existence of 
eight independently owned television stations within such a media 
market. 125 In counting this eight-voice exception, the Commission 
Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,098, 19,119 91 54 
(1999». 
121 ld. at 1128. 
122 See id. at 1135 (citing Implementation of Section l1(c) of the Cable Television 
Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,098, 19,119 91 54 
(1999». 
ld. 
123 The court reasoned, 
[W)e have some concern how far such a theory [of diversity) may be pressed 
against First Amendment norms. Everything else being equal, each 
additional 'voice' may be said to enhance diversity. And in this special 
context, every additional splintering of the cable industry increases the 
number of combinations of companies whose acceptance would in the 
aggregate lay the foundations for a programmer's viability. But at some 
point, surely, the marginal value of such an increment in 'diversity' would 
not qualify as an 'important' governmental interest. Is moving from 100 
possible combinations to 101 'important'? It is not clear to us how a court 
could determine the point where gaining such an increment is no longer 
important. 
124 ld. at 1144. 
125 Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 
Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broad., 64 Fed. Reg. 
50,622 (Sept. 17, 1999) (Report and Order) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) 
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determined that only broadcast television should count because "there 
remain unresolved questions about the extent to which [non-
broadcast television, i.e., cable] alternatives are widely accessible and 
provide meaningful substitutes to broad[cast] stations." 126 The 
Commission adopted a different counting approach for exceptions to 
the radio-television cross-ownership rule in which it does count local 
newspapers and cable television stations. 127 The plaintiffs in Sinclair 
Broadcast challenged the rule on the grounds that eight was an 
arbitrary number of voices and that there was no reason to exclude 
non-broadcast voices. 128 
The D.C. Circuit, while reciting the language of deference in 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, remanded on the ground 
that the Commission irrationally excluded cable from its eight-voice 
count. 129 While the Commission correctly stated that broadcast was 
more important than cable in providing local news, it never presented 
a theory or any data as to why broadcast, but not cable, should 
constitute a "voice.,,130 
By defining diversity in terms of the number of independently 
owned outlets in a given market, the FCC has avoided the difficult 
problem of counting the viewpoints expressed in media markets. 
Clearly, not every participant in the media market counts equally -
the New York Times is not the Upper East Side Weekly Gazette - but 
the FCC has never developed an approach for understanding what 
diversity in the media means. It is certainly true that some cable 
systems, while providing their own national news programming like 
CNN and CNBC, provide little local programming. 
Judge Sentelle, who dissented in part on the grounds that the 
diversity rules should be vacated, not simply remanded, further 
needled the FCC on its imprecision in defining its regulatory terms. 
He attacked the Commission for claiming that eight voices ensure an 
appropriate level of diversity but then failing to provide evidence to 
that effect. l3l While agreeing that an agency has broad discretion to 
draw lines, Sentelle pointed out that "there are no meaningful limits to 




128 Id. at 158-59. 
129 Id. at 169. 
130 Id. at 163. 
l3l Id. at 169-72. 
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much diversity is enough, how much is too little, or how much is too 
much."132 
4. Fox Television Stations v. FCC 
In the 1998 Biennial Review Report, the FCC retained the 
cablelbroadcasting cross-ownership prohibition and the 35% limit on 
the total number of broadcast stations one entity can control 
nationwide. 133 This order was challenged, and the D.C. Circuit 
vacated the FCC's action on the cablelbroadcast cross-ownership in 
Fox Television Stations v. FCC. 134 In doing so, the court rejected the 
FCC's diversity justification primarily on the grounds that it failed to 
consider the large number of new television stations that had emerged 
since 1970.135 As in Sinclair, the court did not defer to the FCC's 
judgment about what constitutes an additional voice for diversity 
purposes. Remanding the order for further consideration, it required 
the FCC to examine the incremental effect of an additional 
independently owned media outlet in a changing media 
environment. 136 
With respect to the national broadcast ownership cap, the court 
again rejected the FCC's diversity analysis. The court looked to earlier 
FCC orders that stated national diversity is not an important goal. 137 
A 1984 FCC report stated that media ownership at the national level 
need not - and given the Commission's local ownership rules, 
cannot - reduce local diversity.138 Again, the FCC's inability to 
define consistently what constitutes a voice for diversity purposes 
proved fatal. 
I32 Id. at 170. 
133 On May 26, 2000 the Commission announced its decision (by a 3-2 vote) to 
retain the National Television Station Ownership Rules ("NTSO") and Cable 
Broadcast Cross Ownership Rules ("CBCO"), and to repeal or modify certain other of 
its ownership rules. A few weeks later the Commission issued a written report in 
which it explained its actions. In re Local Radio Ownership Rule, 47 C F. R. 
§ 76.50l(a) (2007); Nat'l Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 47 CF.R. § 73.3555(e) 
(2007); 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Comm'n's Broad. 
Ownership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. 
Act of 1996. 
134 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C Cir. 2002). 
135 Id. at 1052. 
136 Id. at 1053. 
137 See Multiple Ownership, 100 F.CC2d 17, '1'1 14, 16 (1984) (Report and 
Order). 
138 Id. 'I 43. 
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5. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC 
The FCC consolidated the remands in Fox Television and Sinclair, as 
well as several other proceedings, into the 2003 Biennial Media 
Ownership Order. 139 Unlike the previous reviews by the FCC 
challenged in Fox Television and Sinclair, which largely defended the 
rules, the 2003 Biennial Media Ownership Order significantly 
liberalized the media ownership rules. Interestingly, on appeal to the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the majority (composed of Democratic 
appointees) rejected these liberalized policies but did so using the 
legal playbook honed by conservative courts in striking down the 
media limits. l40 
a. Cross-Ownership and the Diversity Index 
In the 2003 Biennial Media Ownership Order, the FCC eliminated 
both the radio/television and television/newspaper cross-ownership 
prohibitions. l41 In their stead, the FCC allowed unlimited ownership 
in large media markets, retained limits in the smallest markets, and 
relied on a "Diversity Index" (DI) to determine whether other markets 
were "at risk" and subject to further regulation. The FCC modeled the 
DI after the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in antitrust law, 
which measures the degree of concentration in markets for antitrust 
purposes. 142 The HHI is a calculation that squares each market 
participant's share. 143 The higher the HHI, the more concentrated the 
market, and the more potential there is for market participants to 
exercise market power. 144 
Analogously, the DI attempts to measure "viewpoint diversity" 
concentration. It weighs various media (newspapers, radio, etc.) by 
their market share in the total media market. l45 But the DI does not 
weigh the market share of each media firm.146 Rather, within a given 
139 2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,626-28 (2003). 
140 See generally Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(questioning validity of basis for several FCC rules and requiring better justification). 
141 2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. at 13,623. 
142 rd. at 13,777-78. 
143 rd. at 13,789; see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAw OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 12( 4)(a)(2) Od ed. 2005). 
144 See generally 2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. at 15,620; HOVENKAMP, supra note 143 
(describing HHI and its use in modem antitrust enforcement). 
145 Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 403. 
146 See id. at 404. 
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medium, each firm counts equally regardless of its market share. 147 
Thus, to arrive at a DI, the FCC calculates a percentage market share 
for each medium and divides that share by the number of firms in the 
medium. It would then square this result and add the results for each 
firm to obtain the DI. 
Despite this arithmetic complexity, the DI only really counts the 
number of participants in a market, not the diversity and 
dissemination of viewpoints. 148 Thus, unlike the HHI, which is tied to 
market performance in some general way, Le., the greater number of 
firms will ceteris paribus lead to less market power and more efficient 
pricing, it is not clear what the DI attempts to measure. It does not 
measure diversity; it measures market share and the number of market 
participants. 149 Thus, a market with fifty independent radio stations 
all saying the same thing would rank higher in the DI than an NPR 
and Fox News duopoly. There is no demonstrated relationship, 
however, between viewpoint diversity and the number of market 
participants. As Steven Wildman states: "Implicit in the construction 
of the FCC-DI is a belief that ... all outlets in a market make equal 
contributions to diversity. Unfortunately, no empirical support was 
offered on behalf of this assumption."lso Indeed, some empirical 
evidence suggests that, at least for coverage of local news, there is a 
diminishing return, with each additional media outlet in a given 
market being less likely to produce new and different news. lSI 
Remanding the FCC restrictions for reconsideration yet again, the 
Prometheus Radio court rejected the DI, and the FCC's elimination of 
the cross-ownership rules, largely because they failed to coherently 
count heads in order to provide a meaningful estimate of media 
diversity. 152 The DI weighed media firms by market share but then it 
counted firms within each medium as equal. Thus, as the court 
observed, "the Dutchess Community College television and the 
stations owned by ABC" received equal weighting. 153 The Court also 
rejected the Commission's inclusion of Internet news but exclusion of 
cable news in its diversity calculation. ls4 The FCC was on shaky 
147 Id. 
148 Cj. id. 
149 2002 Biennial, 18 F.CCR. at 13,789. 
150 Steven Wildman, Indexing Diversity, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM, supra 
note 58, at 151, 163-64. 
151 Id. at 164 (internal citations omitted). 
152 Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 409. 
153 Id. at 408. 
154 Id. at 408-09. 
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grounds because it attempted to pick and choose which outlets to 
count rather than observe consumer behavior and the nature of news 
coverage. 
b. Local Television Cap 
The 2003 Biennial Media Ownership Order relaxed the local 
television cap, permitting a single firm to own two or three television 
stations in certain markets. Specifically, the order permitted triopolies 
in markets of eighteen stations or more and duopolies in markets of 
seventeen or fewer, provided that in no case would there be common 
ownership in the four most-watched stations. 155 
The FCC, therefore, treated ownership of the fifth, sixth, and 
seventh most-watched stations equivalent to that of the sixteenth, 
seventeenth, and eighteenth. 156 It was designed to ensure that most 
markets would have six firms because six equal-Sized firms would 
create an HHI index below 1800.157 Of course, the FCC simply 
assumed that the firms would be equal-Sized, and the court had no 
problem finding this assumption irrational. I58 Again, the FCC's 
insistence that mere head counting adequately reflects diversity led to 
its indefensible result. 
c. Local Radio Caps 
The ownership order retained the eXIstmg limits of local radio 
ownership, which are tiered to the size of the market. 159 Its most 
restrictive limit was to allow common ownership of up to five 
commercial radio stations in the smallest markets, while allowing 
greater common ownership in larger markets. 16o The FCC designed 
this rule to guarantee five firms in all markets. The Commission 
primarily relied on DO) merger gUidelines and two articles on game 
theory, fifteen and thirty years old ~espectively, for its claim that five 
firms would lead to a competitive market. 161 The Court found the 
155 2002 Biennial, 18 F.CCR. 13,620, 13,639 (2003). 
156 Cj. id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 13,668. 
160 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372,409 (3d Cir. 2004). 
161 Reinhard Sehen, A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition Where Four Are Few 
and Six Are Many, in 2 INT'L]. GAME THEORY 141 (1973). This model is presented 
more intuitively in LOUIS PHILIPS, COMPETITION POLICY: A GAME-THEORETIC 
PERSPECTIVE 23-38 (1995). See also Timothy F. Bresnahan &: Peter C Reiss, Entry and 
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Commission's reliance irrational because the Commission 
contradicted the DOl's merger gUidelines elsewhere, and the DOl's 
policy contradicted these articles' claims as well. Finally, the court 
also found illogical that five voices, regardless of market share, 
contributed meaningfully to diversity.162 
III. WHY THE METAPHOR FAILED: DIVERSITY IN THE MARKETPLACE OF 
IDEAS 
The previous Part discussed the problems with treating media 
regulation as a sort of antitrust regime governing the marketplace of 
ideas. This approach is fundamentally flawed because one cannot 
establish a value (or cost) for each additional viewpoint, particularly if 
the value of media diversity is characterized by such vague terms as 
"robust" or "contentious." Thus, while more viewpoints are perhaps 
better than fewer, the market efficiency standard does not tell you 
when there are enough viewpoints, given that both their cost of 
production and value are obscure. The Time Warner opinion 
expressed this idea when it asked whether at some point an 
incremental increase in diversity would not constitute an "important" 
government interest. 163 
Underlying this problem is the lack of any system to quantify the 
optimum level of viewpoint diversity.164 The FCC does not quantify 
viewpoint diversity; it uses diversity of ownership as a proxy for 
diversity of viewpoint. As Posner pointed out, this may not be a 
rational proxy. Concentrated market structures may produce output 
that caters to more tastes. The question of quantification, therefore, 
becomes central. 165 
Measuring diversity directly is a fraught exercise. Indeed, the 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting Court called diversity an 
"elusive" concept -language that the FCC has quoted in every one of 
Competition in Concentrated Markets, 99 J. POL. ECON. 997, 998-1001 (1991). 
162 Prometheus Radio, 373 F.3d at 432-33. 
163 Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1135 (2001). 
164 Indeed, the FCC may be overlooking the most important type of diversity -
"exposure diversity" - in the media that individuals actually consume. Philip Napoli, 
Deconstructing the Diversity Principle, 49 J. COMM. 7, 24-25 (1999). 
165 Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 12, at 820 (citing J. Gregory Sidak, 
Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1230 (1993» (defending use of 
diversity against Sidak's charge that only "Panglossian" could believe that FCC could 
arrive at neutral definition of diversity). See generally Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show 
(On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REv. 1415 
(1996) (examining retreat from extensive regulation of broadcast media). 
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its major media ownership rulemakings. 166 Why is viewpoint diversity 
so elusive? Media, whether broadcast or newsprint, do not express 
meanings, ideas, or viewpoints in simple ways. Rather, media, like all 
communication, engages in an obscure process by which words "refer 
or are correlated according to some system with certain phYSical or 
conceptual entities."167 If one could delineate what these references 
and correlations are, one could count them and have a handle on 
viewpoint diversity. However, it borders on impossible to achieve an 
objective handle on the number of viewpoints, ideas, or perspectives 
because every individual no doubt employs different references or 
correlations. The best one can do is to achieve some sort of rough 
statistical mean of the references and correlations most people within 
a community would use. This process is admittedly circular because 
"disagreements about interpretations ultimately rest on conflicting 
intuitions." 168 
As a result of this limitation of measurement, diversity of viewpoint 
does not fit well into established social scientific methodologies. The 
late Milton Friedman prOvided a classic methodological statement of 
"positive economics."169 His version of economics - a version that 
166 Not surprisingly, the FCC has been quite fond of describing media diversity as 
"elusive," for the term renders the Commission's judgment somehow more deserving 
of deference. See 2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,790 9[ 432 (2003); 1998 
Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership Rules & 
Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 15 
F.C.CR. 11,058, 11,1019[81 (2000); Review of the Comm'n's Regulations Governing 
Television Broad.: Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy & Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 
12,903, 12,915 n.49 (1999); Evaluation of Syndication & Fin. Interest Rules, 6 
F.C.CR. 3094, 3234 (1991) Games H. Quello, Comm'r, dissenting to overall result, 
and concurring in part); In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of 
the Comm'n's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broad. 
Stations, 95 F.CC2d 360, 9[51 n.112 (1983). 
167 Claude E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL Sys. 
TECHNICAL]' 379,379 (1948). 
168 Michael Martin, Taylor on Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in READINGS IN 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 259, 259 (Michael Martin & Lee C. Mcintyre eds., 
1994). Reflecting this notion, Justice Stewart wrote in his famous Jacobellis 
concurrence that although he could not define the term, he knew pornography when 
he saw it. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,]., concurring). 
Similarly, then-FCC Commission Michael Powell said, "[D]iversity is very hard to 
define, and is at some level a visceral concept." In re Review of the Comm'n's 
Regulations Governing Television Broad.; Television Satellite Stations Review of 
Policy & Rules, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,903, 12,987 (1999) (Report and Order) (separate 
statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell). 
169 Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in READINGS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra note 168, at 649-53. The two main approaches 
in social sciences have been, and continue to be: (1) the naturalistidpositivistic, 
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places the field firmly in the domain of the empirical sciences -
requires theory to abstract "essential features" that can be described in 
particular categories. The validity of economic theory turns on a 
"comparison of its predictions with experience" and must be rejected 
if "its predictions are contradicted.,,170 In other words, economics, like 
any positive social science, must provide confirmable hypotheses 
about essential features, i.e., things in reality which are clearly and 
uncontroversially defined. 
To create clear, uncontroversial enumerations of media diversity 
would be extremely difficult, time-consuming, and expensive because 
what constitutes a distinct viewpoint does not seem to be what 
Friedman would call an essential feature. Consider an important 
study of media diversity, the Berry and Waldfogel analysis of the 
relationship between industry concentration and the availability of 
different radio formats. l7l To determine what constitutes a radio 
format, Berry and Waldfogel used Duncan.172 Duncan, a service for 
radio advertisers, uses eighteen formats to categorize all radio stations 
nationwide. 173 
Berry and Waldfogel are likely justified in relying upon Duncan. 
After all, it is in Duncan's economic interest to accurately measure 
diversity and difference. However, suppose someone disagrees with 
Duncan, claiming that there are eight radio formats; Berry and 
asserting that "the social sciences should approach the study of social phenomena in 
the same way that the natural sciences approach the study of natural phenomena -
that the social sciences should have as their goals prediction and nomological [law-
like) explanations"; and (2) the interpretive method, asserting that there are no laws 
in social science but rather social scientists should use Verstehen or interpretive and 
empathetic understanding to comprehend the meanings and Significance of social 
processes from the subject'S perspective. Introduction to READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra note 168, at xv-xvi. The notion of interpretive 
understanding as the goal for social science probably Originates with the work of 
Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber. Weber defines SOciology as '''that science which 
aims at the interpretive understanding (Verstehen) of social behavior in order to gain an 
explanation of its causes, its course, and its effects.'" LEWIS A. COSER, MASTERS OF 
SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: IDEAS IN HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 220, 231 (Robert K. 
Merton ed., 2d ed. 1977). Not surprisingly, positivism is the dominant approach in 
economics today. See Lawrence A. Boland, Current Views on Economic Positivism, in 
COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THOUGHT 88, 88 (David Greenaway et al. 
eds., 1991) ("Positive economics is now so pervasive that every competing view 
(except hard-core mathematical economics) has been virtually eclipsed."). 
170 Friedman, supra note 169, at 650. 
171 Steven T. Berry &: Joel Waldfogel, Do Mergers Increase Product Variety?, 2001 Q. 
]. ECON. 1009, 1014. 
172 See id. 
173 See DUNCAN'S RADIO MARKET GUIDE (1997). 
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Waldfogel provide no criteria for determining difference in format, 
and thus would have no response to such criticism. Therefore, their 
analysis probably fails Friedman's confirmability and predictability 
criteria. Any rules or theories that might emerge from Berry and 
Waldfogel's work have the potential to be predictive, but only if one 
agrees that there are precisely eighteen radio formats. In fact, the FCC 
explicitly decided that there are fewer radio formats than those found 
in Duncan!IH 
Because radio format probably does not count as one of Friedman's 
essential features, deciding whether the more "correct" radio format 
taxonomy includes only Adult Contemporary (as the FCC Media 
Ownership Working Group research paper maintains) or includes 
Adult Contemporary, Adult Contemporary/Album Oriented Rock, 
Adult Contemporary/Contemporary Hit Radio, Adult Contemporary/ 
New Rock, and Adult Contemporary Oldies (as Berry and Waldfogel 
assumed) requires surveying thousands of radio listeners to arrive at a 
definitive categorization, if any indeed exists. This is a rather 
expensive procedure and utterly impossible considering all the 
potential terms of media diversity and the FCC's limited budget. All 
174 The FCC noted, 
A number of commenters cite a recent study by Berry and Waldfogel that 
found that reductions in the numbers of owners in radio markets led to an 
increase in radio format labels. . . . The evidence presented in MOWG 
["MOWG" refers to the Media Ownership Working Group, the FCC 
taskforce that assisted in assembling agency research for the Biennial Media 
Ownership Order] Study No. 11, however, suggests that the number of 
formats across radio markets has remained flat since the passage of the 1996 
Act. The discrepancy between these two studies is due to the different 
classification of format used in each study. MOWG Study No. 11 uses the 
most general type of classification available in the BIA database [BlA is a 
leading provider of financial intelligence and investment information about 
the media and technology industries], while Berry and Waldfogel uses the 
finer classification formats available in Duncan [another provider of media 
industry analysis]. An example will illustrate the difference. One radio 
format Adult Contemporary taken from the BlA can be broken down into 
five different subformats under Duncan's system: Adult Contemporary, 
Adult Contemporary/Album Oriented Rock, Adult Contemporary/ 
Contemporary Hit Radio, Adult ContemporarylNew Rock, and Adult 
Contemporary Oldies. While we agree that the Duncan formats allow a 
somewhat richer portrayal of the variety of music than the more general 
format categories, we are not certain how substantial the difference between 
many of these minor subcategories within the major categories of format are. 
We therefore question how well the increases in radio formats reported by 
Berry and Waldfogel imply increases in radio program diverSity. 
2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,74091310 (2003). 
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this suggests that regulation based on successfully counting diversity 
of voices is unlikely to succeed. 
IV. FROM THE AGORA TO AGENCY: A NEW ApPROACH TO MEDIA 
OWNERSHIP REGULATION 
This Part defines the agency approach to media ownership and 
compares it to both the democratic-social value approach (which aims 
to use media to encourage democratic discourse) and the economic 
efficiency approach (which views media like any other industry and 
looks to economic efficiency as its gUiding principle). The agency 
approach responds to many of the concerns of the democratic-social 
value approach, but allows for a more workable regulation, namely, 
the democratic-social value approach fails to set quantifiable 
regulatory goals, while the agency approach can. At the same time, 
the agency approach's quantifiable alternative goal - the effectiveness 
of the agency relationship - offers a rigorous alternative to the 
economic approach, which seems blind to non-economic ends that 
people see media as serving. Finally, this Part discusses the idea of 
"idiosyncratic foreclosure," a problem with legislative, not regulatory, 
solutions. 
A. Defining an Agency Approach to Media Ownership Regulation 
Professor Richard Pierce states: "The Constitution is premised on 
the belief that government should act as the agent of the people .... 
[P]ublic law doctrines [should be] deSigned to maximize the power of 
the people to control their agents."175 Conceiving the relationship of 
the citizenry and the elected officials as that of principal and agent 
creates a standard for judging the effectiveness of the relationship. 
The relationship succeeds if the agent follows the principal's wishes 
without engaging in opportunistic behavior by using the trust placed 
in him for his own gain, rather than the principal's. 
This understanding of the relationship between voters and elected 
officials underscores the importance in monitoring government. 
Unless citizens keep tabs on elected officials, they may spend tax 
revenues inappropriately, vote themselves extravagant salaries, divert 
public funds or contracts to favorites, or simply pass poliCies not 
desired by the majority. The media facilitates this monitoring by 
175 Richard]. Pierce,Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory 
of Govemment, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239,1239 (1989). 
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providing CItIzens with the information they need to manage and 
control their agents, the elected officials. 
As Oliver Williamson's transaction-cost and institutional economics 
recognize, the cost of monitoring plays a central role in determining 
the degree to which an agent can engage in opportunistic behavior. 176 
Consider the efforts (Le., monitoring) that employers make to ensure 
that employees do not steal (Le., engage in opportunistic behavior). 
These include expensive video equipment or costly cashier "break 
downs" in which employees are paid to account for everything sold 
that day and make comparisons against revenue received. The more 
expensive these monitoring costs are, the less effective the agency 
relationship typically becomes. 
The media plays a vital role in redUcing monitoring costs and 
ensuring that government officials act in the interest of their 
principals, the People. Rather than conduct their own investigations 
of politicians' activities or scan the Federal Register to learn of 
important government actions, people can simply read the newspaper 
or watch TV. Even in the age of C-SPAN and government Internet 
websites, through which there is a huge amount of available 
information about government activities, the media can serve the 
function of rendering such a mass of information accessible and 
interesting. In this way, the media's ability to lower monitoring costs 
in fact increases in the Internet age, where the sheer amount of 
information is staggering. 
Further, viewing media ownership as redUcing citizen's monitoring 
costs is consistent with the First Amendment, in particular with 
interpretations that see its purpose as furthering political speech. 
Taking aim at the Holmesian marketplace of ideas, Alexander 
Meiklejohn has written that the "First Amendment, then, is not the 
guardian of unregulated talkativeness;" rather, its purpose is to 
facilitate self-government, to render the "voters . . . as wise as 
possible." 177 As such, Meiklejohn rejected the First Amendment's role 
as protecting the manifold of ideas found in Holmes's marketplace. 
Rather, "the right of 'private' speech [is] liable to such abridgments as 
176 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48,222-29 (1996). 
177 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 
(1948). In a similar but more radical vein, Owen Fiss has argued that the First 
Amendment must provide avenues to groups deemed insufficiently audible in the 
public debate, and that it must serve the function of making citizens question their 
views and opinions. OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE 
MANY USES OF STATE POWER 9-31, 151-58 (1996). 
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the general welfare may require."17S Only speech related to citizens' 
role as "makers of the laws" is entitled to "an absolute freedom."179 
A political interpretation of the First Amendment is consistent with 
viewing it as tolerating regulation that reduces monitoring costs. If 
the purpose of the First Amendment is, as Meiklejohn says, to make 
the voters "wise," regulation that creates more political news can only 
further the interests of the First Amendment. In contrast, the 
Holmesian "marketplace of ideas" metaphor supports regulation that 
attempts to control or guarantee a sufficient number of voices, a result 
that has led the FCC down a fraught regulatory road. 
If the function of media ownership regulation is to further political 
news reporting, the question becomes how to accomplish that goal. 
As Part V discusses, the structure of media markets, in fact, largely 
determines the content of news coverage. Due to the cost structure of 
media production, firms will generally create output that caters to its 
market's median tastes and political interests. ISO Geography largely 
determines political interest. Individuals are interested in the political 
jurisdictions, such as state, county, and city, in which they reside or 
do business. 
On the other hand, media geographic markets are not defined by 
political jurisdiction. They are defined largely by federal and state law 
through spectrum allocation and cable franchise. If a media market is 
contiguous with a political jurisdictional boundary, it will be more 
likely to produce news about that jurisdiction, because all of its 
audience will have a similar interest in that jurisdiction. If the media 
market is split between political jurisdictions, there is less incentive to 
produce news about either jurisdiction. In this way, law and 
regulation play a central role in determining the effectiveness of 
media's political monitoring ability. 
Consider the Philadelphia broadcast television and radio market. 
FCC television regulation distributes spectrum to the Philadelphia 
area, including parts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and 
Maryland. lSI There is no clear "median taste" for state news in this 
178 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 177, at 95. 
179 Id. at 89. 
180 David Stromberg, Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public 
Policy, 71 REV. ECON. STUD. 265, 265-67 (2004) (citing Barry Litman, Microeconomic 
Foundations, in PRESS CONCENTRATION AND MONOPOLY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
NEWSPAPER OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION 3,17-34 (Robert G. Picard et al. eds., 1988)). 
181 See In re Revision of Procedures Governing Amendments to FM Table 
Allotments & Changes of Cmty. of License in the Radio Broad. Servs., 21 F.C.C.R. 
14,212, 14,234 tbl. (2006) (Report and Order); Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules 
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market area because its audience contains individuals with disparate 
tastes in state news. Compare this with the television market area of 
Harrisburg, which is wholly contained within one state, Pennsylvania. 
State news would interest a greater number of individuals in the 
Harrisburg market area. In this way, geographical structure dictates 
media content. 
Regulating geographic and ownership structure to maximize news 
output offers a much more workable alternative to regulating to 
maximize "viewpoint." As discussed in detail in the following section, 
the FCC should look to economic theory and empirical evidence to 
identify those structures that are likely to produce the most news in a 
given region. Unlike the "voices" analysis, this regulatory analysis, on 
the empirical side, would involve counting the amount of time 
devoted to political news that various market structures produce. This 
inquiry - time consuming, but hardly impossible - requires 
researchers to watch news stations and identify political news. 
Indeed, many researchers have done this to examine media content. 182 
Armed with these insights, the FCC could make reasoned decisions 
about whether given mergers, or given media ownership restrictions, 
would be in the "public interest" in that they maximize the incentives 
for the production of political news. 
B. Agency, Democratic-Social Value, and Economic Approaches to 
Media Ownership Regulation and the Problem of Idiosyncratic 
Foreclosure 
The agency approach to media ownership regulation elides the 
difference between the economic and democratic-social approach to 
media ownership. Recalling the dispute between Bentham's claim that 
"poetry is as good as push pin" and Mill's position that there are 
"higher goods" and "lower goods,"183 democracy- or social-value based 
Regarding Modification of FM & TV Authorizations to Specify a New Cmty. of 
License, 4 F.CCR. 4870, 4870-71, 4872-75 (1989), reconsideration granted in part, 5 
F.CCR. 7094 (1990). 
IS2 See, e.g., PETER ALEXANDER & KEITH BROWN, FCC, OWNERS DELIVER MORE 
LOCALISM (2004), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materialslalready-
releasedldoownersdeliver070004.pdf (employing 1998 database of 4078 news stories 
from 60 local television stations collected over five-day period). 
IS3 Bentham reportedly said, "[Plush-pin is as good as poetry." JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND ESSAY ON BENTHAM 123 (1962). Push-pin was a sort 
of mechanical pinball game popular in the nineteenth century and boasted the youth-
wasting reputation that video games enjoy today. Mill responds that push-pin is not 
equal to poetry because some pleasures are "higher" than others, a position he 
captured in the well-known apothegm: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied 
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commentators find the economic arguments reductionist and counter 
that media markets undervalue civil concerns. 184 Howard Shelanski 
sums up the difference between the democracy-social value and 
economics/market-based camps as follows: 
Proponents of deregulation [the "economic-based 
commentators"] define the public interest, often implicitly, in 
terms of fostering a market that does the best possible job of 
satisfying consumers' programming preferences. This version 
of the public interest aims for an efficient market, where 
efficiency means that media companies take consumer 
preferences as given and produce as much content as people 
want, in the varieties they want, as cost effectively as possible. 
Even if "better" programming or content choices might 
exist ... decisions about what to consume and supply are for 
individuals and media companies, not policy officials, to 
make .... Opponents of deregulation [the "democracy-based" 
or "social value" commenters], on the other hand, typically 
define the public interest in terms of fostering constitutional 
and social values of quality and diversity, as well as preserving 
an effective forum for informed public debate. In this model, 
what the economic market would dictate gives way at some 
point to what is necessary to achieve an open and broadly 
representative marketplace of ideas. 185 
1. The Democracy-Social Value Approach 
Consider the justifications for media ownership regulation put forth 
by its "democracy" advocates. Drawing on the work of John Dewey, 
Cass Sunstein argues that the purpose of media should be to develop a 
"deliberative democracy."186 This rational requires the "considered 
judgments of a democratic polity" proceeding from "a shared civic 
culture" and a "degree of commonality among the citizenry."187 For 
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." Id. at 260. 
184 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 
501 (2000) ("There is a large difference between the public interest and what interests 
the public. This is so especially in light of the character and consequences of the 
communications market. One of the central goals of the system of broadcasting, 
private as well as public, should be to promote the American aspiration to deliberative 
democracy .... "). 
185 Shelanski, supra note 17, at 383-84. 
186 SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 18. 
187 Id. at 72, 76. 
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such a consensus to develop, the media must be diverse, and at the 
same time it must foster a shared vocabulary and common intellectual 
heritage. ISS Similarly, drawing on the work of Jurgen Habermas, 
Professor C. Edwin Baker argues in his theory of "complex 
democracy" for a contentious media with plural conceptions of what is 
good for society. The ideal media speech exposes citizens to 
difference; at the same time that difference is exposed in speech. 
According to this conception, the ideal marketplace attracts a varied 
public with a wide range of wares, inviting comparisons between the 
known and the unknown. ls9 
The democratic media theorists must agree, as a first step, that to 
pursue their goals, media ownership regulation should increase 
information about government. One cannot gain a consensus about 
essential political aims, as Sunstein might urge, without having 
knowledge about politics. One cannot expose oneself to different 
views about politics, as Baker might want, without having information 
about politics. Ideal democratic involvement - whether civic 
republican, Habermasian, or whatever political normative standard -
requires knowledge about the polity. Any vision of a deliberative 
democracy that furthers commonality and contemplation of difference 
must have facts about how democratic leaders and government 
function. In this way, the agency approach is completely consistent 
with the democratic approach. 
This is not to ignore the genuine difference between the agency- and 
democracy-based approaches. Advocates of democracy-based 
regulation might prefer not to view citizens as self-interested 
consumers of government services. 190 They would see the purpose of 
media as cultivating higher tastes, i.e., poetry, not push-pin. The 
agency model of media ownership does not argue that media should 
change or elevate taste. Rather, it argues that citizen's political desires, 
preferences, and aims must be considered as important as their 
economic desires, preferences, and aims: that FCC policy must 
188 Id. at 18-19. 
189 Baker, supra note 12, at 760; see also Isolde Goggin, Spectrum Management and 
the Achievement of Policy Goals - an Independent Regulator's Perspective, in 
COMMUNlCATIONS- THE NEXT DECADE: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS PREPARED 'FOR THE UK 
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS 235, 244 (Ed Richards et al. eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.ofcom,org.uklresearchlcommsdecadelsection4.pdf (questioning "how to 
balance market mechanisms with the need to ensure that spectrum is available for 
services of general economic or social interest, while ensuring efficient utililisation"). 
190 SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 72 ("There is reason to be extremely cautious about 
the use, for constitutional and political purposes, of the notion of 'consumer 
sovereignty."') 
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recognize both homo economicus and homo politicus. In other words, if 
people choose to have democratic institutions, they must also choose 
to have them function properly. Only a citizen/elected official agency 
relationship informed by a rich diet of political news can ensure this. 
Further, pro-democracy commentators tend to see ownership 
restrictions as ends unto themselves, advocating limits without 
specifying how any particular limits can be set. 191 An agency approach 
would examine the likelihood that a merger or a spectrum allocation 
would produce more or less news about relevant political institutions. 
It would permit mergers or ownership structures that have no effect 
on the output of news; it would be indifferent to mergers or ownership 
structures that would have a small impact on the output of news. 
Finally, the democracy-based advocate might still argue that 
diversity of ownership, for its own sake, must be a policy goal. For 
instance, consider C. Edwin Baker's six justifications for media de-
concentration: 
(1) Local owners will likely be more concerned about quality than 
out-of-town conglomerates. 
(2) One media interest, allied with a political interest, may exercise 
an excessive control over a democracy's civil discourse. 
(3) Decentralized control performs a watchdog or checking 
function - correcting the errors and mistake of anyone source 
of information. 
(4) Decentralized ownership prevents control of the media by 
corporate interests outside of media - interests that may skew 
reporting. 
(5) Concentrated ownership can lend itself to co-option by one 
particular approach to the news, such as Rupert Murdoch's. 
(6) Concentrated media structures can create unwelcome synergies 
with other corporate interests. 192 
None of Baker's concerns involves media robustness. Rather, they 
involve media control and the fear that media will be used, not to 
further civil discourse, but to further private corporate interests or 
personal political or financial interests of media owners. This type of 
"idiosyncratic foreclosure," in which owners of media fail to cover 
stories hostile to their interests or political or cultural ideology, seems 
191 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 12, at 734-35. 
192 Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 17, at 902-14. 
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especially dangerous in rural areas with few media outlets. In fact, 
these outlets may have close financial and even personal connections 
to the political and business establishments. 
While those subscribing to an economiC perspective may dismiss 
this fear on the grounds that a profit-maximizing media firm will 
provide the views and content the market wants and not the 
idiosyncratic views of its owner, this response can ring a bit hollow, 
particularly given the extraordinary degree to which large media firms 
are held by individuals or families rather than publicly traded 
corporations. 193 Even the most diehard advocate of efficiency-based 
regulation would admit that if a firm engaged in idiosyncratic 
foreclosure, it would take time for the market to correct and diScipline 
such a firm. Consider the case of The New York Times. Its critics have 
long alleged that it has left-wing or politically correct bias. Its 
ownership structure, however, gives management control to members 
of the Ochs-Sulzberger family. Despite The New York Times' 
disappointing business performances, ownership and management has 
appeared resistant to change. 194 
The regulatory solution for this problem is difficult because it is 
unclear at what point the chance of idiosyncratic foreclosure becomes 
so great that ownership restriction is necessary. The FCC cannot state 
that the risk of idiosyncratic foreclosure is eliminated at any point, 
because there is no metric for such a contingency. Without such a 
metric, courts are unlikely to accept any answer based solely on the 
193 See Belen Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How Do Family Ownership, Control and 
Management Affect Firm Value?, SO J. FIN. ECON. 3S5, 405-06 (2006) (showing how 
multigenerational family ownership decreases firm value and mentioning New York 
Times); Leon Lazaroff, New York Times Families Withdraw Morgan Stanley Funds 
(Update?), BLOOMBERG, Feb. 2, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.comlappslnews?pid= 
20601OS7&sid=aqdZ.2T2x2xc&refer=home (explaining mechanics of Sulzberger 
control of New York Times ownership structure). 
On a different ideolOgical coin stands the Murdoch family, and in between are the 
Roberts of Cablecast, EchoStar's Charlie Ergen, and the protective share classes of the 
McClatchy family'S ownership. As of the time of writing, the Tribune Co. and Clear 
Channel, Inc. are in negotiation to return to private hands. Indeed, rigorous empirical 
investigation has revealed that next to government, family-owned businesses dominate 
media ownership worldwide. See Simeon Djankov et at, Who Owns the Media?, 46J.L. 
& ECON. 341, 341, 357 (2003) ("We examine the patterns of media ownership in 97 
countries around the world. We find that almost universally the largest media firms 
are owned by the government or by private families."). 
194 Seth Sutel, Shareholders Plan Proxy Fight at NIT: Investors Plan to Name Their 
Own Slate of 4 Directors at N.Y. Times Co., YAHOO, Jan. 2S, 200S, http://biz.yahoo.coml 
ap/OSO l2S/ny _times_shareholders.html? v= 11. 
HeinOnline -- 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1593 2007-2008
2008] Media Ownership Regulation 1593 
grounds that more voices decrease the risk of foreclosure in some 
unspecified amount. 
The appropriate solution to the problem is to allow Congress to set 
simple limits. This approach would establish clear business 
expectations and would receive a deferential rational basis review in 
court. Politicians have an interest in avoiding idiosyncratic 
foreclosure because it reduces their ability to communicate with 
voters. For instance, President Clinton, a media consolidation 
opponent, used to tell people there were only two major media outlets 
in Arkansas, one owned by a detractor. If the detractor owned both, 
Clinton claimed that neither he nor any other progressive would ever 
get his message across. 195 Indeed, Congress is already addressing this 
problem. For instance, when the 2003 Biennial Media Ownership 
Order lowered the national television cap, a Republican Congress, in 
an unusual, pro-regulation reversal, raised it. 196 
2. The Economic Approach 
An agency approach to media ownership responds to the economic 
critique of media regulation. Professor Howard Shelanski, a former 
FCC chief economist, has summed up the critique as follows: 
Advocates of deregulation often portray ownership rules as 
unproductive relics out of step with the realities of modern 
media markets. They view the rules as remnants of 
competition policy implemented to deal with markets in 
which broadcasters were far more powerful than they are in 
today's increasingly digital environment of competing cable, 
satellite, Internet, and broadcast platforms. From this 
perspective, the policy objective behind ownership rules 
should be to ensure that media markets respond efficiently to 
consumer demand. 197 
The economic critique suggests that the FCC should not regulate at 
all because markets can best respond efficiently to consumer demand. 
Advocates of this approach argue for the elimination of virtually all 
195 Eric Boehlert, Former FCC Chairman: Deregulation Is a Right-Wing Power Grab, 
SALON, May 31, 2003, http://dir.salon.comlstory/newsifeatureJ2003/0S/31/[cd 
index.html. 
196 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3,99-
100 (2004); Frank Ahrens, Compromise Puts TV Ownership Cap at 39%, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 25, 2003, at A19. 
197 Shelanski, supra note 17, at 382. 
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ownership rules. 198 Any harm that increased media concentration 
could cause would be purely economic. They therefore rely upon 
antitrust law to regulate media ownership. They see little need for 
media ownership regulation to further diversity because the market 
can best be relied upon to provide media that people want. They tend 
to see democratic theorists as foisting their views onto others. 199 
The agency approach avoids this debate. It does not argue that 
media robustness is a good that the market provides inadequately or 
that the market can best respond to individuals' desires. Rather, it 
argues that the application of agency theory to media ownership 
regulation implies that media ownership regulation must render the 
agency relationship between the citizen and elected official more 
effective by lowering monitoring costs. Just as the media satisfies our 
consumer desires qua our roles as homo economicus, so it should satisfy 
our political goals qua our roles as homo politicus. Given that the 
government taxes us Significantly, we want them to spend that money 
according to our wishes. Media ownership regulation should make 
information about the government more available so as to ensure that 
politicians do as we wish. 
Of course, the economics-based advocate might critique this agency 
approach by arguing that if people really cared about how their taxes 
were spent, the markets would cater to that interest and would provide 
all the information adequate to monitor government. To "pay" more 
for taxes in the form of potentially inefficient media government 
regulation is therefore absurd. This argument misses the mark. 
First, the question is not whether one would wish to pay more to 
the government in the form of media regulation. The question is, 
since we already pay taxes - a situation not likely to change any time 
soon200 - do we want a portion of those taxes spent on reducing 
monitoring costs and thus guaranteeing that such money is spent 
according to our wishes?201 Second, the cost of this type of media 
regulation is trivial. It would involve bumping marginally interesting 
198 See, e.g., Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note 12, at 730-31 (suggesting that 
proper First Amendment scrutiny would "safeguard free speech values against these 
dangers" of "unintentionally degraded . . . quantity, quality, and diversity of 
programming availability."). 
199 See supra notes 13, 17. 
200 See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Letter to Jean-Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), 
reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 69 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907) 
("[IJn this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes."). 
201 I am indebted to Peter J. Alexander for this inSight. 
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entertainment-type news for more serious political news.202 Given the 
contempt that most people express about local news' obsessions with 
inane human interest stories and endless crimes and fires, this seems 
at least ex ante a price most would pay. Third, if government 
distributes spectrum or creates cable franchises, it is already engaged 
in structural regulation. At the very least, it must be cognizant of how 
its existing structural regulation affects the political process. 
V. ApPLYING AN AGENCY ApPROACH TO MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
REGULATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHIC MARKET STRUCTURE 
The need to intervene in media markets stems from the importance 
of political news about government. The next question is, therefore, 
how media ownership regulation can do this. There are two main 
ways in which government could influence the production of political 
news: subsidization or structural regulation. 
Many prominent legal academics have called for subsidies. For 
instance, Sunstein states that the public interest goals of 
communications policy can "promote the aspiration to deliberative 
democracy."203 He recommends several means to achieve this end, 
including mandatory public disclosure of information about public 
interest broadcasting, economic incentives to encourage worthwhile 
discourse, and voluntary self-regulation, as through a code of 
appropriate conduct, to be created and operated by the industry 
itselP04 Professor Ellen P. Goodman argues for subsidies to encourage 
public service media and other types of media that markets are likely 
to underproduce. 205 
Government subsidies, however, tend to become political footballs, 
with the specter of political imperatives affecting news coverage. With 
the possible exception of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, our 
nation has been hesitant to directly involve government in the 
production of news. Given the government's tendency to abuse mass 
media - as evidenced by such phenomena as The Triumph of the Will, 
the genOcidal Serbian radio and television under Slobodan Milosevic, 
or even the constant irritating debate about whether National Public 
202 In addition, to the extent current media markets mirror communities, which 
may share demographic and consumptive characteristics, changing these media 
markets may impose costs on advertisers. 
203 Sunstein, supra note 184, at 503. 
204 Id. at 504. 
205 Goodman, supra note 17, at 1393. 
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Radio is a tool of the cultural left - Americans seem wise to hesitate 
over government subsidies in this area. 
Robert Post has provided a critique of state-supported speech. He 
argues that when the government assumes the role of civics teacher to 
inform and educate citizens, the government aspires to "an 
Archimedean point that stands outside of the processes of self-
determination" that all its citizens undergo. 206 In other words, when 
the state assumes the role of teacher, it assumes that it has the right 
answers. Even if the state has the right answers, however, Post argues 
that "citizens engaged in collective self-determination through 
participation in public discourse are not students to be taught, but 
autonomous masters of their fate. They are adults, not pupils.,,207 
Yet, even adults require raw information about politicians' activities 
in order to judge them. Using structural regulation simply to provide 
greater incentives to independent firms to produce more news does 
not render citizens into puerile students of the state. Rather, it makes 
them more empowered, intelligent citizens. Because structural 
regulation does not require the government to make content-based 
decisions, even on the funding level, it does not place the government 
in a superior position with the charge to enlighten the popUlace. 
Indeed, the decision to use structural regulation to increase the output 
of political news is, in and of itself, an artifact of collective self-
determination. As a group, citizens decide to order their markets in 
such a way so as to produce a result - more political news - that 
better serves their political aspirations. In this way, government is not 
a teacher of the citizenry, government is simply the citizens' tool. 
While an objective Archimedean point might not exist, citizens need 
the tools to build their own scales and to discover their own balance. 
Turning to the tool - structural regulation of the media - this 
Article does not argue that current understanding of the relationship 
between industry ownership and geographic structure provides a 
blueprint for maximizing political activity and information. Current 
knowledge is far too rudimentary. Rather, current research suggests, 
as discussed below, certain regulatory questions and concerns. 
206 Robert Post, Constitutional Law: Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1538 (1997) (reviewing FISS, supra note 177). 
207 Id. 
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A. Media Structure, Media Content, and Political Behavior: A Brief 
Survey of the Current Literature 
News production is an industry characterized by high fixed cost and 
low incremental cost. Producers, therefore, aim to produce news 
items of interest to the greatest number of consumers within their 
markets, ceteris paribus, because every additional sale (or added 
eyeball watching a program) translates into higher profits or higher 
advertising rates. 20S What constitutes news interesting to the greatest 
number of consumers is a function of the media industry'S structure 
and geographic boundaries. A medium, like television, with a national 
audience will have a different "median audience" than a newspaper 
with a purely local audience. Similarly, a media conglomerate that 
owns numerous newspapers in different markets will also have a 
different median audience than independent, locally owned media 
outlets. 
Recent scholarship in economics, political science, and 
communications demonstrates a strong relationship between media 
industry ownership structure (e.g., who owns the media, how large 
media firms are, and the size and shape of media geographic markets) 
and various types of political behavior. 209 
1. Media Structure and Political Participation 
A growing body of research demonstrates the relationship between 
access to media and political participation. Interestingly, these studies 
tend to show that access per se does not increase voting; rather, access 
to media that is likely to cover political news increases political 
participation. Moreover, these studies conclude that media structure 
plays a key role in determining whether a particular medium covers 
political news. 
Matthew Getzkow showed that consumer substitution away from 
newspaper and radio and towards television led to the well-known, 
208 Alexander & Brown, supra note 10, at 23 ("Many media products incur up-
front fixed costs and constant (and often low) marginal costs. Consequently, media 
firms will only produce content that appeals to enough people to cover their fixed 
costs."); Stromberg, supra note 180, at 265 ("One feature is that mass media operate 
under increasing-retums-to-scale. For example, once a TV programme has been 
produced, the extra cost of an additional viewer is quite small. For a newspaper, the 
cost of producing the first newspaper is high. But once this fixed cost has been borne, 
the variable cost of selling additional newspapers is just the cost of printing and 
delivering. "). 
209 See infra Part V.A.1-4. 
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precipitous drop-off in participation in elections from the 1940s to the 
1970s.21O He showed that the dispersion of television in the late 1940s 
and 1950s dramatically decreased voter turnout, primarily because 
television contained more entertainment and less news compared to 
the then-dominant media, newspaper and radio. Getzkow argued that 
television caused substitution away from newspapers and radio, and 
showed that television provided less political information than either 
of these other media. His work also demonstrated that the gap was 
larger for information about congressional races, resulting in less 
knowledge about politics and lower turnout in voting. 211 
Television's effect on political participation and knowledge is quite 
significant. Television reduced off-year turnout in an average county 
by 2% per decade. 212 The introduction of television explains half of 
the total off-year decline in turnout since the 1950s.213 The effect on 
presidential-year turnout is smaller, accounting for roughly a quarter 
of the total decline. 214 
Getzkow demonstrated a structural relationship between media 
markets and political knowledge. He showed how the amount of 
information about local congressional races affects voter turnout. He 
hypothesized that the more congressional districts into which one 
media market is divided, the more congressional races are taking place 
within that media market in a given election year, and the less 
coverage local stations can provide for anyone race. He showed that 
the degree to which media markets are contiguous with political 
boundaries effects turnout in off-year congressional elections (but not, 
of course, presidential elections, as all media markets would be 
interested in national events).215 
Similarly, Scott Althaus and Todd Trautman showed that geographic 
structure of media markets affects political behavior. They showed 
that all areas contained within larger markets - urban, suburban, and 
rural alike - tend to have lower levels of voter turnout than urban, 
suburban, and rural areas within smaller markets. 216 They concluded 
210 See generally Matthew Gentzkow, Television and Voter Turnout, 121 Q.]. ECON. 
931 (2006). 
2ll See id. at 967. 
212 See id. at 933. 
213 See id. 
2H See id. 
215 See id. at 934. 
216 See Scott L. Althaus & Todd Trautman, The Impact of Television Market Size on 
Voter Turnout in American Elections, (Univ. of Ill., Working Paper No.3, 2006) 
("[TJhe size of local television markets is closely related to aggregate turnout levels."). 
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that the size of local broadcast markets determines how much 
localized political information an area receives - larger markets will 
have less information about discrete political jurisdictions contained 
within them. 217 
Finally, Lisa George and Joel Waldfogel in Does The New York 
Times Spread Ignorance and Apathy?218 showed that increased local 
penetration by The New York Times decreases local newspapers' 
penetration, thereby reducing local news content and participation in 
local elections. They suggest that The New York Times contains less 
local news, and thus as consumers read it more, they become less 
knowledgeable about, and involved with, local news and issues. 
2. Media Structure and Political Knowledge 
Research has shown the relationship between media market 
structure and citizens' knowledge about government. Markus Prior 
demonstrated that different structures of media markets produce 
different levels and, in particular, different distributions of political 
knowledge. For instance, the rise of cable television and Internet 
access increases consumer choice and increases divergence in political 
knowledge. These new media allow individuals with preferences for 
political information to gain more. 219 At the same time, individuals 
with aversions towards political information and preferences for 
entertainment can more easily avoid political Information and, in fact, 
the new media facilitates such individuals' ignorance about politics. 220 
Prior has also shown that television, which provides generally 
favorable news about incumbents, strengthens the incumbency effect 
in elections. He showed that the incumbent effect increased during 
the 1960s along with the rapid dispersion of televisions. He showed 
that political knowledge increased with television in general, but most 
markedly among those who had the lowest levels of political 
knowledge. Such individuals received most of their information from 
television, and therefore formed views favorable to incumbents. 221 
217 Id. 
218 Lisa M. George & Joel Waldfogel, The New York Times and the Market for Local 
Newspapers, 96(1) AM. ECON. REV. 435-47 (2006). 
219 See MARKUS PRIOR, THE INCUMBENT IN THE LIVING ROOM: THE RISE OF TELEVISION 
AND THE INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE IN U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS 657-71 (2002). 
220 Id. 
221 Markus Prior, Efficient Choice, Inefficient Democracy? The Implications of Cable 
and Internet Access for Political Knowledge and Voter Turnout, in COMMUNICATIONS 
POLICY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: PROMISES, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS 143, 143-45 
(Lorrie Faith Cranor & Shane Greenstein eds., 2002). 
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In a similar study, concentrating on geographic market structure, 
Snyder and Stromberg showed how congruence between congressional 
districts and local media markets leads to greater political knowledge 
about Congress and other locally elected officials. They strongly 
suggest that the media will produce information that caters to the 
median consumers' taste, and that such a median, when it comes to 
political news, is affected by political boundaries. 222 These studies 
suggest that regulators should look closely at the relationship between 
geographic markets, media, and political behavior. 
3. Media Dispersion and Receipt of Government Benefits 
David Stromberg showed how increased radio penetration increased 
voter turnout during the New Deal. Further, he showed that areas 
with greater radio penetration were more likely to receive federal 
money distributed by the state governor for unemployment relief. 
Stromberg argued that increased radio penetration led to more 
information about government, allowing individuals to better monitor 
government activity, or at least monitor it in a way more compatible 
with their own interests. 223 
His research provided an interesting riposte to the widely accepted 
view that mass media has little effect upon individuals' opinions. For 
instance, citing the famous work of Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 
Bruce Owen argued that the media do not truly influence individuals. 
Rather "communication with friends, family and co-workers, and 
opinion leaders dominates in the diffusion and acceptance of ideas.,,224 
More recent research shows the limited role the media plays in 
forming opinion. Some studies show that consumers use media from 
fewer sources even as the number of sources available to them 
increases.225 Philip Napoli states that the "empirical evidence ... is 
less than compelling" that "citizens take advantage of the diversity of 
sources and content available to them to become the well-informed 
decision makers that a well-functioning democracy requires. "226 
222 JAMES M. SNYDER & DAVID STROMBERG, MARKETS' IMPACT ON POLITICS (Sept. 2008), 
available at httpJ/americandemocracy.nd.edulspeaker_serieslfileslSnyderPaper.pdf 
223 rd. 
224 Owen, supra note 12, at 682. 
225 See NAPOLI, supra note 62, at 151; SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 59-84; Philip M. 
Napoli, Access and Fundamental Principles in Communication Policy, 2002 L. REV. MICH. 
ST. U. DETROIT c.L. 797,800 (2002). . 
226 Napoli, supra note 225, at 802 (2002). 
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This may all be true. However, when it comes to helping 
individuals obtain available benefits from government, mass media 
appears to playa role. Research shows a relationship between media 
availability and improved access to government aid and subsidies. For 
instance Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess showed that areas in India 
with higher penetration of mass media received greater aid during 
famine and nature disasters. 227 
4. Ownership Structure and Likelihood to Produce Local News 
Recent research also suggests some relationship between the extent 
of local ownership of television stations and the likelihood of local 
news coverage. Alexander and Brown showed that· there is a 
relationship between the amount of local news produced by a 
broadcast station and whether the station is locally owned.228 Their 
research indicated that locally owned stations produced Significantly 
more local news. Another study repeated this striking result, showing 
a more elaborate relationship between local ownership and the 
production of local news, and demonstrating a positive relationship 
between local ownership and the length of local news stories. 229 
In somewhat different findings, Yan and Napoli tested the oft-
asserted notion that allowing cross-ownership will increase local news 
and public affairs programming. no They found that cross-ownership 
is not related to the quantity of local news or public affairs provided.23i 
This result is consistent with Wirth and Wollert, who found no 
relationship between group ownership and the provision of news or 
public affairs programming.232 Napoli and Yan, however, found 
evidence that station owner size, as measured by percentage of the 
national television audience reached, was positively related to a 
227 Timothy Besley &: Robin Burgess, The Political Economy of Government 
ResponSiveness: Theory and Evidencefrom India, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1415, 1415-16 (2002) 
("We are able to demonstrate a robust link between the development of mass media, 
political factors, and government responsiveness."). 
228 See ALEXANDER &: BROWN, supra note 182, at 1, 13-16. 
229 Nodir Adilov, Peter]. Alexander &: Keith Brown, From Many, One: Cross-Media 
Ownership, Scope, and Scale: Story Choice in Local Broadcast News (Indiana-Purdue 
Univ., Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.peterjalexander.comlimagesl 
ScaleScopeCrossOwn_F eb _15_2007 _. pdf. 
230 Michael Yan &: Philip Napoli, Market Competition, Station Ownership, and Local 
Public Affairs Programming on Broadcast Television, 56]. COMM. 795, 795-97, 807-09 
(2006). 
231 Id. 
232 Michael O. Wirth &: James A. Wollen, Public Interest Programming: Taxation by 
Regulation, 23]. BROAD. 319,326 (1979). 
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station's decision whether to air local public affairs programming, but 
was unrelated to the quantity of such programming aired. 233 
B. The Current State of Knowledge and Policymaking 
The current state of knowledge concerning the relationship between 
media structure and content is still too rudimentary to provide clear 
policy prescription. For instance, no one can state with precision the 
exact effect of local ownership limits or national cable subscriber caps 
on media content or media firms' likelihood to cover political issues. 
Despite these limitations, current research does give regulators some 
insights and reliable generalizations concerning the relationship 
between media structure and content. 
First, regulators must take into account the relationship among 
geographic media markets, the legal creation of these markets, and 
content. Theory and empirical analysis strongly suggest that media 
firms will seek stories, ceteris paribus, of interest to the median tastes 
of their market. To the degree media markets and political boundaries 
are contiguous, one will see more political news. 234 Second, 
availability of media tends to increase political knowledge. 23S To the 
degree that media structures tend to produce less political news, one 
will see a less informed citizenry. Third, the availability of media, 
while not necessarily changing people's opinions or views, does appear 
to make them cognizant of available government benefits. 236 
Recall how media regulation currently works. The FCC attempts to 
promote competition, diversity, and sometimes, localism.237 It does 
not, in fact, measure viewpoint diversity, but simply asserts that 
diversity of ownership will produce viewpoint diversity. It then 
selects in a largely arbitrary way the number of independently owned 
media in a given market. Regulation focused on the relationship 
between media structure and news output would avoid the problems 
diversity presents. Above all, it provides workable metrics. The 
number of news stories and amount of news are easily measurable. 
Further, it would allow regulators a clear goal and purpose with which 
to examine the subtleties of media markets. The section below 
233 Yan &: Napoli, supra note 230, at 808. 
m See supra Part V.A.I. 
235 See supra Part V.A.2. 
236 See supra Part V.A.3. 
237 2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,62391 5 (2003) (setting forth these three 
goals as purpose of media ownership regulation). 
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considers how this approach resolves various regulatory questions 
currently before the FCC. 
1. The Cross-Ownership Prohibitions: Localism and Agency 
The newspaperlbroadcast rule limits cross-ownership of television 
stations and daily newspapers within the same local media market, as 
well as radio and television stations within the same local media 
market. 23B In the 2003 Biennial Media Ownership Order, the FCC 
eliminated the rule, but in "at-risk" areas, the FCC applies its Diversity 
Index - an approach the Third Circuit rejected - to determine 
whether there is sufficient "viewpoint diversity."u9 The FCC justified 
its decision to eliminate the cross-ownership prohibitions primarily on 
the grounds that allowing mergers between newspapers and television 
and radio would introduce economies of scale into local markets, 
thereby increasing the output of local news. Subsequent empirical 
research failed to support this. 240 
This Article's suggested approach to media ownership provides a 
clearer regulatory analysis for determining whether cross-ownership 
would be permitted within a given media market. First, the regulator 
would examine the state jurisdictions in the area involved. The 
regulator would see whether there were numerous state jurisdictions, 
like the Chicago media market which includes Illinois, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin, or whether there was only one state jurisdiction, like the 
Los Angeles media market. Second, the regulator would examine the 
nature of the local political jurisdiction to determine if there is one 
major political jurisdiction, such as the City of Denver (in the Denver 
media market) or several like the Minneapolis market (including both 
the St. Paul and Minneapolis city governments). Third, one would 
examine existing media market boundaries. Television spectrum is 
distributed according to media market, determined by the FCC tables, 
while radio stations have greater freedom to choose their community 
of license.241 Some radio stations conceivably could, therefore, have 
markets centered on certain political jurisdictions within a major 
media market. Similarly, newspapers could have geographic markets 
that might slice out a portion of the larger media market, e.g., a 
newspaper dedicated to Long Island news within the New York City 
media market. 
238 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3SSS(c) (2007). 
239 Id. 
240 Yan & Napoli, supra note 230, at 801-03. 
241 See supra note 181. 
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A regulator's job would be to ensure that geographic markets create 
incentives to produce news about relevant political institutions. For 
instance, a regulator might reasonably determine that a merger 
between a New Jersey newspaper and Philadelphia-based television 
station might result in less political news, particularly state and local, 
making such a merger suspect. Conversely, a merger between a 
Philadelphia newspaper and a Philadelphia-based television station 
would not prompt concern because the resulting media outlet would 
have the same incentives for producing state and local news. 
Similarly, if a radio station with a community of license (the 
community in which a radio station is located and in which it has 
authority to use spectrum) different from the television community of 
license were placed under joint ownership - say, a New York City 
area newspaper and a Long Island radio station - less political news 
might result, at least compared to a joint ownership or control of radio 
and television stations with identical footprints. 
2. Television and Radio Local Limits 
The 2003 Biennial Media Ownership Order relaxed both the 
television and radio local limits. The FCC's order permitted a Single 
firm to own two or three television stations in certain markets. 242 The 
FCC continued to prohibit common ownership among the top four 
stations in any given market. 243 This was designed to ensure that most 
markets would have six firms because six equal-sized firms would 
create an HHI index below 1800, and therefore, it was assumed, would 
present no competitive problems. 244 The FCC simply presumed that 
the firms would be equal-sized, and the court had no problem finding 
this assumption irrational. 245 
The 2003 Biennial Media Ownership Order retained the existing 
limits of local radio ownership, which are tiered to the size of the 
market. This rule. was designed to guarantee five firms in all markets. 
The Commission primarily relied on DOJ merger gUidelines and two 
articles on game theory, fifteen and thirty years old respectively, for its 
claim that five firms would lead to a competitive market. 
Just as with the cross-ownership limits, the degree to which any 
particular media outlet specializes in one jurisdiction would be 
Significant in determining whether merger would be appropriate. 
242 2002 Biennial, 18 F.C.C.R. at 13,66891134. 
243 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 412 (3d Cir. 2004). 
244 See id. at 433-34. 
245 See id. at 434. 
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Specifically, radio mergers between stations with different "home 
cities" would be more suspect than mergers between radio stations 
with the same "home cities." If the proposed co-owned station had a 
service area that spanned different political boundaries, the merger 
would be particularly suspect. 
Television station mergers would be much less suspect due to the 
peculiarities of television licensing. The FCC chooses the geographic 
scope of television licensing, and with rare exception it chooses the 
geographic scope of television licenses to be coterminous with a major 
metropolitan area.246 Radio stations, on the other hand, have greater 
freedom to determine the geographic boundaries of their market. 
They can choose which locality to serve.247 While most radio stations 
choose allotments coterminous with major metropolitan areas, they do 
not always. The difference in coverage can be very important in more 
rural areas. Therefore, merger of these radio stations can Significantly 
affect the likelihood that certain types of news will be produced. 
This effect can be found within media markets as well. Consider a 
media market that includes numerous political jurisdictions, for 
example, either cities or counties, with one jurisdiction much larger 
than the others. Such a media market will likely have news about the 
large jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. Media markets that 
contain numerous political jurisdictions of the same size may in fact 
destroy incentives to cover news about these smaller political 
jurisdictions. Local news preferences would be too fractured to allow 
firms to profitably cater to each of them. 
This "substitution effect" may not affect the total quantity of local 
news, but rather its content, substituting serious political reportage for 
news with negative externalities. Because preferences in local news 
are fractured among the various smaller jurisdictions, news that 
interests the entire community but with negative externalities, such as 
incessant stories about crime and fires, may dominate local news. 
Thus, by including numerous smaller political jurisdictions, the 
geographic structure of media markets may affect the content of local 
news, explaining the documented phenomenon that crime stories are 
covered to a hugely disproportionate degree by local news. 248 This 
246 See In re Amendment of Section 3.606 Regarding Television Broad. Serv., 41 
F.C.C. 148,149-52 (1952) (Sixth Report and Order). 
247 See In re Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding Modification of FM & 
TV Authorizations to Specify a New Cmty. of License, 4 F.C.C.R. 4870,4872 (1989). 
248 ALEXANDER & BROWN, supra note 182. 
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likely has highly negative effects, furthering certain racial and ethnic 
stereotypes, as Jerry Kang has powerfully argued. 249 
3. Jurisdiction and Media Structure 
Once it is established that media ownership regulation should 
decrease monitoring costs by encouraging market structures more 
likely to produce more news programming, a question emerges. In a 
multijurisdictional society like the United States, virtually every 
market structure favors one level of government over the other. For 
instance, to the extent a given community overlaps state boundaries, 
distributing spectrum locally according to a community might create 
geographic media markets that are less likely to cover state news. The 
degree to which media firms own outlets outside a given community 
also complicates production biases. Owners of firms that have outlets 
in numerous political jurisdictions may have an incentive to produce 
more news that would be interesting to consumers of all its media 
outlets. That would mean that such firms might produce more 
national news at the expense of local news. 
VI. REGULATION OF POLITICS, REGULATION OF SPEECH 
Media ownership regulation wed closely to its political effects ceases 
to be mere economic regulation and becomes much more akin to 
political regulation. Recognizing the links between media and 
political behavior reveals the FCC's public interest analysis as being 
concerned with what political discourse should be. Stripped of its 
faux antitrust veneer, media ownership regulation is political 
regulation, more akin to campaign finance or anticorruption measures 
than trade regulation. 
This realization clarifies the confused, hoary minefield of the 
standard of review for media ownership regulation. Structural 
regulation concerning broadcast television and radio (and possibly 
other forms of media) still theoretically receives the deferential review 
found in National Broadcasting Company and National Citizens 
Committee for Broadcasting, yet lower courts do not seem particularly 
deferentiaP50 On the other hand, cable regulation receives 
intermediate scrutiny.251 Given the inevitable technological 
convergence, in which content will be delivered indiscriminately on 
249 Kang, supra note 9, at 1495. 
250 See Part II.B. 
251 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1994). 
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mobile wireless devices, televisions, and computer screens, the media-
specific regulation will collapse by the weight of its own anachronism. 
This Article suggests, however, that in its place courts should apply 
a standard of review to media ownership that is appropriate for the 
regulation of elections. This follows from a view of media ownership 
regulation as political regulation aimed at creating a better agency 
relationship between elected officials and the citizenry. The aims of 
media ownership regulation under this view would be like those of 
campaign finance regulation - to make elected officials more 
responsive to voters. Both campaign finance and media ownership 
regulation limit free expression - the ability to contribute to a 
political candidate and the ability to own media outlets, respectively. 
Ironically, both aim to improve the functioning of democracy by 
limiting speech. In defense of this seemingly contradictory pursuit, 
the empirical evidence discussed above suggests that certain types of 
media structures will produce more political news. Therefore, as an 
empirical matter, democracy might be more effective if there are 
certain ownership regulations. 252 
There remains, however, the normative argument: Should we 
abridge the First Amendment rights of corporate ownership for the 
hope of a better functioning democracy? Ronald Dworkin, in his 
defense of campaign finance limits, has sketched out an answer. He 
observes that campaign finance regulation involves a trade-off between 
campaign contributors' First Amendment rights and the improved 
function of the democratic process through the elimination of 
improper influence, or at least the appearance of impropriety.253 This 
is the precise balance that media ownership regulation strikes between 
the First Amendment rights of those who own media and the 
improved function of the democratic process. 
Dworkin points out that one cannot trade off rights, like free speech, 
in order to further other democratic goals. Further, such a trade-off, 
particularly if mandated by the government, is risky: 
Our Constitution ... should commit us to the prophylactic 
judgment that democracy is best served, in the long run, by a 
rule that forbids government any power to try to improve 
it ... by compromising the freedom of people to say what they 
like. . Justice Scalia set out that argument in 
252 See discussion supra Part V.A.4. 
253 See Ronald Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY 
FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 63, 97-101 
(E. Joshua Rozenkrantz cd., 1999). 
HeinOnline -- 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1608 2007-2008
1608 University of California, Davis [Vol. 41:1547 
characteristically vivid language in 1990. He referred to the 
idea that "too much speech is not an evil that the democratic 
majority can proscribe," and he declared that the idea "is 
incompatible with the absolutely central truth of the First 
Amendment: that government cannot be trusted to assure, 
through censorship, the 'fairness' of political debate. ,,254 
Dworkin responds to Scalia's argument that while one cannot 
balance between free speech and a better functioning democracy, one 
can "discriminate" between regulation of speech that "appreciably 
damages either citizen sovereignty or citizen equality," which is 
forbidden, and "regulations of political speech that improve 
democracy on some dimension when the defect that they aim to repair 
is substantial, and when the constraint works no genuine damage to 
either citizen sovereignty or citizen equality."255 
This normative argument can be applied to the structural regulation 
of media. There must be a "substantial" defect that exists within a 
media market to justify regulation. This might exist in a state like 
New Jersey with numerous media markets, but few media outlets have 
a strong economic incentive to cover state government. A similar 
situation may exist with a city or local government contained in a 
large media market with other, bigger local entities. 
Given the similar values and trade-offs between media ownership 
regulation and campaign finance, it would seem that one way to 
resolve the confusion concerning the appropriate standard of review 
for structural regulation would be simply to adopt the standard for 
campaign finance regulation. Under the Supreme Court's most recent 
holding on the regulation of campaign contributions, such laws 
receive something less than strict scrutiny but more than mere rational 
basis. The Court states that where 
interests directly implicate the integrity of our electoral 
process, and ... the successful functioning of that process ... 
and [blecause the electoral process is the very "means through 
which a free society democratically translates political speech 
into concrete governmental action, ... [tlhe less rigorous 
standard of review we have applied to contribution limits 
(Buckley's "closely drawn" scrutiny) shows proper deference to 
Congress'[sl ability to weigh competing constitutional 
interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It 
254 rd. at 82-83. 
255 rd. at 84. 
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also provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and 
respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations 
designed to protect the integrity of the political process.256 
This seems, as well, to be the right answer for how courts should 
view structural media regulation. Before the FCC blocks a merger or 
limits ownership rights, it must be able to tell a fairly convincing 
story, either theoretically or empirically, showing that its regulations 
will substantially increase news output. Such a standard would 
provide a unity to the fractured standards of review the media now 
receive, with television and radio broadcast regulations reviewed 
under a nominal strict scrutiny,257 and cable and satellite receiving 
intermediate scru tiny. 258 
VII. THE FUTURE OF SPEECH AND ITS REGULATION 
Media regulation, which traces its origin to the New Deal, assumes 
an industrial structure that is equally ancient - a structure dominated 
by broadcast television and radio. Yet, despite its age and 
anachronism, rumors of this structure's death have been exaggerated. 
Broadcast television stations are largely kept alive through generous 
support from Congress in the form of must-carry regulation -
regulation that requires cable to carry their signals and shelters them 
from competition from nonlocal stations. 259 Congress has imposed on 
direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") providers similar duties to broadcast 
local stations.26o Broadcasters have also received gifts of free 
spectrum.261 This Article is about media regulation as it exists and will 
likely exist for the next decade. Yet it must be recognized that the 
Internet is transforming media structure. As Rupert Murdoch states: 
"Power is moving away from the old elite in our industry - the 
editors, the chief executives and, let's face it, the proprietors. ,,262 The 
256 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.s. 93, 136-37 (2003). 
257 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
258 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
259 A discussion of the must-carry regulations are beyond this Article's scope. See 
JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAw AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 480-82 (Robert 
C. Clark et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
260 See, e.g, Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988,17 U.s.c. § 119 (1994). 
261 See Bob Dole, Giving Away the Airwaves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A29. 
262 Owen Gibson, Internet Means End for Media Barons, Says Murdoch, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://media.guardian.co.uklsite!story/ 
0,,1730382,00.html. 
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cause of this shift relates to the way the Internet circumvents existing 
regulatory structure. 
Specifically, the distribution of news via the Internet lacks many of 
the previously characteristic structural features of news production 
discussed above. First, it has no geographic boundaries. This creates 
an entirely new "median audience." It is no longer the median of any 
media market, but quite literally the world. Further, the Internet 
transforms the high fixed costilow marginal cost structure of the 
media. With blogs and YouTube, anyone can potentially attract, with 
minimal expense, an enormous audience for one's news, articles, or 
videos. Thus, the structural drivers of media content - a geographic 
market set by FCC license assignments, and cost structure - will fade 
in importance. These changes suggest that the media dystopia of Cass 
Sunstein's Republic.com, in which matters of public concern become 
minimized within the deadening weight of media choice, may not be 
too off the mark. 263 
Sunstein's remedy, direct government subsidies, is hard to swallow. 
Direct government involvement in media production produces 
controversial results, as evidenced by the endless squabbles over the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Rather than direct subsidies, 
political reporting perhaps should be treated as artistic and charitable 
institutions currently are. Change the tax code to allow political 
reporting to function as a charitable organization, perhaps on the 
condition that the organization refuse commercial funding. 
Subscriptions to these "charitable" political news services would be 
tax deductible "contributions," and entities that conducted political 
news reporting would be nonprofit and tax-exempt. In other words, 
create more of a market for numerous "public media," like National 
Public Radio or the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which would 
respond to private, not governmental, demands. 
Political reportage would move, therefore, into the world of art and 
other worthy activities, rather than matters for mass consumption. 
This is both comforting and disturbing. On the comforting side, news 
reporting bears a tremendous similarity to art or literature or 
scholarship in that these activities interest only a minority, but 
presumably have tremendous positive externalities, creating a more 
vibrant, dynamic society for everyone. Viewing political discussion 
263 See generally SUNSTEIN, REPUBLlC.COM, supra note 17 (describing balkanization 
caused by filtering of information on Internet). This idea is "in the air." On the day I 
presented this paper to the MSU Law School faculty colloqUium, an editorial in the 
Wall Street Journal appeared calling for nonprofit status for newspapers. See Steven 
Rattner, Red All Over, WALL ST.]., Feb. 15,2007, at A19. 
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and reporting as an elevated pursuit is reasonable and may, in fact, 
improve the behavior of politicians. On the disturbing side, the retreat 
of serious political discussion into certain enclaves marks a significant 
shift in the populist course that this country has taken since the 
presidency of Andrew Jackson. Knowledge is power. When political 
knowledge becomes concentrated within certain groups or factions the 
risk of opportunism and disenfranchisement increases. 
CONCLUSION 
For the last seventy years, the FCC has justified its media ownership 
regulation based on a metaphor: the antitrust law for the marketplace 
of ideas. This Article has shown that this misused metaphor has led to 
a regulatory bankruptcy with the FCC incapable of creating rules that 
courts will uphold. In contrast, this Article has suggested that media 
regulation must embrace its political nature, recognizing the function 
media plays in lowering the cost to citizens of monitoring their elected 
representatives. Media regulation must encourage industry structures 
that maximize news output. Research about the effects of industry 
ownership and geographic structure on the content of political news 
and political activity could gUide this regulation. Setting media 
structure to maximize news output creates private incentive for certain 
types of media production but avoids government's direct involvement 
in content decisions. Even as current media structures shift, however, 
this Article argues the goal of maximizing political news output with 
minimal government oversight must gUide regulation. With changing 
media industry structures, this maximization may involve using the 
tax exemption to encourage political reporting. 
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